

# WHY ANIMALS ARE SPIRITUAL BEINGS?

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**ABSTRACT:** This essay analyzes the different meanings of the notions of the “soul” and the “spirit,” which were changing direction at the same time that man has developed his intellectual capacity and his dominion over nature. Next, it will be shown that using the notion of spirit, while distinguishing characteristic of men in relation to other living things, a speciesist ideology was being built and that this ideology lies behind the ethics that excludes animals from the sphere of moral consideration. Finally, we aim to demonstrate that although this way of thinking of Greek philosophy still exerts a great influence in the Western tradition, it presents a series of contradictions and inconsistencies that point to its exhaustion as an ethical and epistemological model, which announces the birth of a new ethic, divorced from this tradition of the domination of nature by men, that prioritize the subjective and emotional instead of objective and scientific, thus indicating, among other things, the recognition of the intrinsic value of animals, in a paradigm based on compassion, sympathy, reciprocity and exchange.

**KEY-WORDS:** ethic, speciesist ideology, intrinsic value.

**RESUMO:** Este ensaio analisa inicialmente os diferentes sentidos das noções de alma e espírito, que foram mudando de sentido ao mesmo tempo em que o homem foi desenvolvendo a sua capacidade intelectual e seu domínio sobre a natureza. Em seguida será demonstrado que a partir da noção do espírito, enquanto característica distintiva dos homens em relação aos demais seres vivos, foi sendo construída a ideologia especista que está por detrás da ética que exclui os animais da esfera de consideração moral. Por fim, pretende demonstrar

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que embora essa maneira especial de pensar da filosofia grega ainda exerça uma grande influência na tradição ocidental, ela apresenta uma série de contradições e inconsistências. Desta forma, aponta-se para o seu esgotamento enquanto modelo ético e epistemológico, ao mesmo tempo em que se anuncia o nascimento de uma nova ética, que divorciada da tradição moderna de dominação da natureza pelos homens, prioriza o subjetivo ao emotivo, em detrimento do objetivo e científico, afirmando o reconhecimento do valor intrínseco dos animais em um paradigma baseado na compaixão, simpatia, reciprocidade e o intercâmbio.

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** ética, ideologia especista, valor intrínseco.

**SUMMARY:** 1. Introduction – 2. Body and soul – 3. Mind, spirit, self, thought and so on – 4. Reason and speciesism – 5. The language of the mind – 6. Conclusions – 7. Notas.

## 1. Introduction

They really had the heads, the voice, body and hair of pigs, but they retained as before the “spirit” (noûs) perfect. Homer<sup>1</sup>

What makes us indifferent to the suffering of animals? Why have we built an ethical system in which human suffering of any kind is seen as an affront to all humanity while million of animals are killed annually in scientific experiments and in the cosmetics industry without eliciting the same sense of compassion or mercy? So engrained is our acceptance of this situation that many of us may never have wondered about it.

The truth is that speciesism, like racism or sexism, a prejudice based upon morally irrelevant physical differences,<sup>2</sup> is so deeply ingrained in the minds of majority of people that they act as if it was a natural behavior, without realizing that these rules are both arbitrarily assigned and inconsistently applied.

Indeed, the exclusion of animals from our sphere of morality assumes that they are devoid of spirit. As such, animals are assumed to not experience mental activities like wanting, thinking and judging, or attributes such as speech, symbolic language,

free will, logical reasoning, intuition, consciousness of self, or production of culture.

Although the empirical sciences have already proven these arguments to be incorrect, these ideas are nevertheless rooted in both common sense and Western traditions. On top of all, these ideas were the official dogma of the Catholic Church for centuries.

The notions of soul and spirit have several, often contradictory, meanings, since “soul” and “spirit” are as often seen as synonyms, but sometimes as a genus and species, or even as separate entities.

This metaphysical question has had an important role in the development of speciesist ideology, and it has served as a starting point for a moral tradition designed to serve the interests of man, whether clear or hidden, rather than of other species.

This essay analyzes the different, evolving meanings of the terms “soul” and “spirit,” and tracks their changing meanings vis a vis the progressive development of man’s intellectual abilities and domination over nature.

Further, It will show that the notion of “spirit” is a distinguishing characteristic of human beings and the means by which they establish their relation to other living beings. It is this idea of “spirit” on which speciesist ideology was built, as it is the ethical basis for the exclusion of animals from the sphere of moral consideration.

Finally, it will demonstrate that however the Western tradition was influenced by the Greek philosophical model, it presents a series of contradictions and inconsistencies that indicate its exhaustion as an ethical and epistemological model. At the same time, this model announces the birth of a new ethic, divorced from the traditional thinking of man domination over nature, that prioritize emotive and subjective, rather than objective and scientific behavior, thus affirming, among other things, the moral value of animals on the basis of compassion, sympathy, reciprocity, and exchange.

## 2. Body and soul

Just as there is no known society without religion, there is no religion, however crudely organized, in which we do not find a system of collective representations dealing with the soul – its origin and destiny.<sup>3</sup>

The word soul, from the Latin *Anima*, *Âme* in French, *Psykhé* in Greek, and *Seele* in German, is typically used to mean a principle of life, sensitivity, movement or group of psychic activities.

Initially, we must emphasize that this notion was not an invention of Greek philosophy, because primitive man already used this idea to explain, for example, the experience of leaving the body during a dream.<sup>4</sup>

To primitive man, thoughts and images found in prayer and in dreams had the same value, causing an open sense of duality between the body and the soul. Both body and soul are made of subtle, ethereal matter that is able to pass through the pores of the body and travel to other worlds.<sup>5</sup>

Only later, when primitive man realized that his dreams were filled with memories of past events and featured people who were already dead, did he conceive of a third element: the “spirit.”

Indeed, because of primitive man’s belief that every natural event was a reward or punishment for his actions, the concept of the spirit plays an important role in the rituals of life and death that are the roots of all ancient religions.

The rituals that accompany death are born of two basic fears: first is the idea that the dead could return to take revenge for the injustices they suffered during their life, and second, the idea that, a failure to comply with certain burial customs or rituals could result in the deceased returning to earth.<sup>6</sup>

Certainly, it was this belief in the soul of the dead as the subject of retribution that was behind the Orphic religion of the early Greeks. Only when Greece was conquered by northern

tribes was this belief supplanted by the idea of a heavenly spirit, such as Olympic Zeus of the Homeric religion, and one in which the soul of the dead becomes the object of retribution, not the subject.<sup>7</sup>

The concept of a soul as we know it today, that is, as an entity in and of itself or a substance that manifests in a standalone principle, is indebted to Greek philosophy. In ancient Greek, the word *Psykhé* means breath, life breath, or life; this noun was derived from the verb *psykhein*, which means to blow or breathe. The nature of these words becomes clear in Homeric poems in which the *psykhé* separates from the body; for example, when Sarpédon faints at the sight of Hector's corpse, his spirit (or *Psykhé*) returns to him through the air. After death, however, the *Psykhé* moves away from the body and takes a different form as an *éidolon*. An *éidolon* is an image or simulation that reproduces the features of the deceased at the time of their death; only after proper burial will the *éidolon* enter Hades.<sup>8</sup>

According to Plato, the soul exists in three forms, two originating in the world of perception, that is "desire" and "disposition," and one related to the divine or spiritual world, "thought." In Plato's view, desire is present in both animals and plants; in humans, it is located just below the navel. Disposition is located in the chest and the abdomen of men, but can also be found in children, slaves, and animals. Though, on the other hand, Plato designates as the exclusive domain of humans.

The soul, then, has substance or cause and is the most important mechanism of a living body; but, unlike the spirit, it cannot be separated from the physical body. The soul, therefore, is life itself, and it is to the body as vision is to the sight organs.<sup>9</sup>

For Aristotle, the soul, and its functioning, is linked to the senses of the body: the vegetative (*threptikón*) is common to all living beings, the locomotive (*kínesis*) is common to all animals (including man), but the sensitive (*aisthetikós*) and imaginative (*phantasia*) are present only in humans and very few other animals.

This understanding of the soul, which is an essential element of Greek religion, connects it to the very meaning of life. For the Stoics, for example, it represents the congenital and animating breath (*pneuma*) of life, rooted in the true meaning of human existence.

Thus, it is this sense of embodiment, the set of possibilities linked to the feeling body—movements, emotions, passions, pain and physical pleasure, common attributes to all animals—that will be inherited by the Latin languages to describe all living things (*animale*). In other words, all beings have a soul and, because of this, are called *animale*.

Indeed, the soul is the seed and inner life that expresses itself in outward appearances such as a glance or a gesture, communication that goes beyond the body to express the inner being—“it is beyond body limits, it lurks, and at the same time it needs of the body, it ends into him, it is *anchored* in him.”<sup>10</sup>

### 3. Mind, spirit, self, though and so on

We have no evidence as yet about mind or the power to think; it seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers. All the other parts of soul, it is evident from what we have said, are, in spite of certain statements to the contrary, incapable of separate existence though, of course. Aristotle.<sup>11</sup>

The notion of the “spirit,” *noûs* for the Greeks, *mind* in English, *esprit* in French, *Geist* in German, has also been described in a number of ways, the most prominent of them, though, is the Greek conception of an understanding or intellectual soul.

Free from any part or space in the body (unlike the soul that spends much of the time inside of the body), the spirit is immortal. Even after the death of the body, the spirit continues to exist. Beliefs about the spirit have been as inconsistent as those on the soul. In Roman Italy, for instance, only certain, well-respected men were thought to possess a spirit (*mana*).<sup>12</sup> Therefore, immortality of spirit

was reserved for only a few. In the Greek philosophical tradition, beyond the physical body (*soma*) and soul (*psykhé*), a third element distinguishes man from other species—a mind (*noûs*) independent of the body through which *vita contemplativa* activities are done.

One thing, however, that is particularly remarkable is that thought was a fundamental activity of man. This was one of the first discoveries by the Greek philosophers, discussed widely from the moment that they became aware of the separations between body and soul and between soul and spirit. Despite this, it was not until the first century of the Christian era that Paul of Tarsus created the concept of free will and not until the eighteenth century that Kant conceived of the ability of judging as an independent, spiritual activity.<sup>13</sup>

In antiquity, however, the concept of a spirit used to refer to the conscious immaterial “self,” or that which experienced the body’s contact with the soul, experiences that manifest as passion, desire, and action, ensuring a perfect identity for a man from birth to death. In the Orphic tradition, the body came from the earth while the spirit came from heaven; their united experience, though, was entirely unique.

Thus, with the body dies instinct (*thymós*) and understanding (*nôus*) — although the soul (*psykhé*) may briefly recover. For instance, the *eidolon* of Achilles was able to talk to Ulysses to send him a gloomy view about the afterlife. In another passage of the *Odyssey*, when in the *Odyssey* Circe the companions of Ulysses were turned into pigs, they still retained the *nôus*.<sup>14</sup>

Either way, the dichotomy between soul and spirit in a way reconciled the fear of death with the theory of divine retribution to the bad behavior.<sup>15</sup> That is until Plato philosophically justified this “religion of souls,” unifying the notion of a soul that is responsible for human life with the notion of a mind whose existence is prolonged beyond death.<sup>16</sup>

Influenced by Pythagoras’ doctrine of the transmigration of the soul, Plato saw the mind as an immortal soul made of a homogeneous substance similar to immutable ideas. For Plato, the mind

and the spirit were one in the same, and thus, the production of the mind, that is its ideas, are as immutable as the soul itself; therefore, the philosopher can conclude that the spirit, as well as ideas, existed before man on earth, just as they will exist after his death.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, according to this doctrine, knowledge is linked with time and the reminiscence of past lives; truth lives in a transcendental space.

In the Myth of Er, for example, which is the ultimate parable of the *República*, a priest is conducted to the realm of the dead, where he has the opportunity to contemplate true knowledge. In the realm of the dead, this priest also learns that spirits must be reborn into other bodies and, through actions in their new bodies, purify themselves from their past mistakes. In this tale, reincarnated spirits can choose the body in which they want to reincarnate. On their way back to life, they must drink water from the river of oblivion (*Lethé*) so that they forget the ideas of their former lives. While those who chose bodies of a king, a warrior, or a rich dealer end up drinking lots of water, those who chose the body of a sage drank just a little water. Knowledge, therefore, is nothing more than a memory inherited from the wise, immortal spirits from the past.

In Plato's conception, then, the bodily senses are natural barriers to knowledge because knowledge resides deep in the memory of all people, but this knowledge can be accessed only through deep, unfettered contemplation.<sup>18</sup> This, however, is the major obstacle in Plato's political philosophy because, if all knowledge (*noêsis*) is pre-existent and it must be awakened by reason to exert itself through the seizure of ideas, the government of philosopher-kings lacks easy justification for their power.

Thus, in the *Phaedrus*, Plato reconciles the post-existence of the spirit doctrine present in the *Górgias* with his pre-existence doctrine developed by Menon. He devises a system based on dualism between the body and the spirit wherein the spirit symbolizes the moral sphere (good) that struggles to free itself from the influence of the body (evil).<sup>19</sup>

In *Phaedrus*, the Platonic Socrates, undisturbed before serving his sentence and taking the hemlock, tells Cebes that a man should

not fear his own death because his spirit, which resides within himself and observes things as an independent entity, will return to what is pure, eternal, immortal, and immutable, renouncing the desires of the body, the fascination of riches, the shame and disgrace of dignities and honors.<sup>20</sup>

Another peculiarity is that alongside the many faculties of the soul that are common to all animals, Classical philosophy makes clear that only man has a spirit, which is essentially another kind of soul: the intellectual soul (*noûs*), which is subdivided into a passive spirit (which is related to the sensitive soul) and an active spirit (which is form and produces thought).<sup>21</sup> Indeed, Aristotle said that while the soul (vegetative, locomotive and sensory) already exists in the embryo, the spirit can release itself from the body, thus allowing the possibility of man performing an activity that has no connection with the body.<sup>22</sup>

It is possible to identify this philosophical tradition in the work of Hannah Arendt, who uses the English word *Mind* to describe at least three different senses, namely: (1) as *vita contemplativa* or sphere of mental activity that opposes the *vita activa*, (2) as the process of thinking, or all the mental faculties of man, and (3) as thought, which is a subdivision of thinking, opposed to cognitive or logical-deductive reasoning.<sup>23</sup>

Therefore, if the essential elements of the *vita contemplativa* is the invisibility or, in other words, the elimination of corporeality and the temporary shutdown of the world of appearances through the forgetfulness of being and the search for the meaning of things, such ownership and non-alienation of the world manifests itself only through the use of the word and the appointment of things.<sup>24</sup>

Nonetheless, this issue is connected to the Greek concept of immortality in the sense of the continuity of time, as it occurred both with the Olympian gods and with nature itself, where immortality was guaranteed by reproduction.

In Rome, man, mortal by nature, enjoyed a certain kind of immortality as the result of the production of things or works, deeds, and words that left traces of them even after death. Eternity, unlike

earthly immortality and the *vita activa*, was possible only through the *vita contemplativa*, or, outside of human affairs.<sup>25</sup> With the fall of the Roman Empire, however, it was clear that no human work could be truly immortal, and from the moment that Christianity became the exclusive religion of Western humanity, the quest for eternity turned the *vita activa* of the political animal (*bios politizos*) into the servant of the *vita contemplativa*, which shall now be given priority.<sup>26</sup> It is precisely the primacy of the *vita contemplativa* that would later be absorbed by the Christian world through St. Augustine.

For Augustine, inner reflection, or confession, was the only way to access the reality of the human spirit. Guilherme de Ockham, however, refuted this view, arguing instead that both thought and will belong to the body; as parts of the human spirit, they are generable and corruptible and thus barriers to the reality of the spirit that lies within, incorruptible. For de Ockham, access to the truth of the spirit was a matter of belief, not fact.

Leibniz uses the word *Geist* to refer to “knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that distinguishes us from mere animals and makes us have access to reason and the sciences, raising us to knowledge of ourselves and God. That is what we call in the rational soul or spirit.”<sup>27</sup>

There are many ways that the spirit takes over, and in the idealism of Hegel, for example, this occurs at the manifestation of an idea, or in the experience of infinite reason. Hegel espouses a much more comprehensive meaning for the spirit, although he assigns to the subjective spirit the traditional sense of intellect or reason.

Within the Hegelian philosophical system, the objective spirit exists in a variety of fundamental human institutions, such as morality (subjective and interior), law (objective and exterior) and ethics (unity of subjective and objective in the family, civil society, and in the state), while the absolute spirit is the historical reality that reveals the world of values through the arts, religion, and philosophy. It is also in this sense that Dilthey conceives of the spirit in the sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) as a branch of knowledge that deals with the rational activities of man, while for Spranger (*Lebensformen*,

1914, p. 7), the objective spirit is found in the study of the collective or ultrapersonal forms of historical life.<sup>28</sup>

In Hartmann, however, the spirit is always objective and lies in historical and social institutions, in institutionalized values, or even in the forms of life, such as the built environment, literature, the arts, technical advancements, religions, myths, science, and philosophy. The real, physical world, then, is formed by both physical organic and inorganic layers that co-exist with a psychic world that is composed of elements of the soul and the spirit.<sup>29</sup> Also in Dewey (*Experience and Nature*), the objective spirit appears as a belief system, recognitions, ignorance, acceptances, denials, expectations, assessments of meanings established under the influence of custom and tradition.

Clearly, the dichotomy between the soul and the spirit became imperative in the Western philosophical tradition. In modern thought, the soul has come to refer to an inner life that expresses outward appearances and the true meaning of things, while the use of metaphors characterizes the conceptual language that expresses the life of the spirit (*mind*).

This is the silent, internal dialogue—thought—where the spirit operates, just like the soul's life is best expressed by a sound or a gesture, not through speech. Consequently, as the soul is the place where our passions, feelings, and emotions arise, its invisibility is similar to our internal organs, whose functioning or non-functioning we understand and acknowledge, but cannot control.

Therefore, passions have their own expression: we become red with rage, lit with happiness, and radiant with joy, while the life of the spirit is pure activity, and its only expression is alienation.<sup>30</sup> As there are no sensations pertaining to spiritual activities, they are experienced in the same way as the functioning of bodily organs.

In this conception, affections of the soul are the same for the entire animal kingdom, naturally expressed by inarticulate sounds, while the distinction and individuation occurs only through discourse, through the use of nouns and verbs, which are symbols of spirit.<sup>31</sup>

## 4. Reason and speciesism

We treat them as creatures without individuality or purposes of their own, and attempt to conceal or to destroy any features which do not fit our preconceptions. We consider ourselves the only sources of meaning, and think our animal kin are brute, or bestial. Stephen Clark<sup>32</sup>

As we have seen, the Western tradition, as a rule, excludes animals from any moral consideration, and the proof of this is that thousands are killed daily, sometimes for the sheer delight of men. Nonetheless, man has the ability to think about his actions and realize that the act of killing animals is, at least in some measure, evil, even when this act is committed in fulfillment of our survival instinct.

It is from this astonishment (*thaumádzein*) at the suffering and death of animals that man tries to find ontological differences between humans and animals. The result of this was a constructed ethic that justifies, for example, practices such as hunting, scientific experiments, and the slaughter of animals for consumption.

This is not a simple problem, but it is clear that the notion of the spirit as an exclusive attribute of man is at the root of the ethical constructions that legitimize discrimination based on species. (Members of the human species, for example, by paying a tax, or other finance practices that require the sacrifice of members of another species fundamental interests, even though those practices aim to satisfy a secondary interest.)

An ethical construction such as this aims to establish itself as a real ideology, clearly demonstrating how its theories, philosophical systems, and scientific foundations solve a social, economic, or political problem. In the end, proponents of this speciesist ideology have formed themselves into powerful instruments of reality dissimulation for the purposes of exploitation, for the domination of one group over another. Therefore, whereas speciesist ideology posits that only members of a single species should be considered equals, there is a more inclusive approach to interspecies

relations wherein all species are considered equal across the moral community.<sup>33</sup>

This more inclusive ideology is based on the transitive notion of the spirit (*noûs*) that has its historical roots in both the Greek philosophical tradition and the Judeo-Christian religious tradition. In these traditions, it is the spirit that is the primary factor distinguishing man from animal; whereas man's spirit is immortal, animals only have a perishable soul (*anima*) that is subject to the wishes and needs of the body.<sup>34</sup> However, it is necessary to know under what circumstances this ideology has developed and to consider the historical realities that caused its tenants to develop so arbitrarily.

Initially, we need to understand the social context in which Greek philosophy was written. The Greek world, as it is described in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, was a highly militarized society dominated by a small privileged class, one created by strain and fed by inherited wealth and where war was a common event.<sup>35</sup> For example, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the major representatives of the Greek philosophical tradition, never sympathized with the Athenian democratic government and always criticized its ideals, where peasants and workers were considered political equals. It was members of the Athenian upper classes, well born, wealthy and educated, much like Plato himself, who were major fans of the aristocratic regime of Sparta.<sup>36</sup> Indeed, Sparta, as a society, professed ideals close to those popularized by Plato; for example, Spartan citizens were trained from childhood to be good soldiers, so that patriotism, courage, and discipline were considered the main virtues, not equality.

This Greek militarism, however, needed a voice, a philosophy that justified it, and this voice came from Plato. Plato's doctrine was inspired by the Spartan regime, a society in which the educated, wealthy minority (the *aristoi*) governed the ignoble majority. Perhaps that is why the Sophists—foreign teachers who taught the youth of wealthy families the art of democratic public life—were so opposed and slandered by Socrates and Plato.

Interestingly, although Greek philosophy was conceived as the unencumbered love of knowledge, regardless of the benefits that it could provide, Plato's ideas will always be related to the political, social, and religious life of the city. Indeed, Plato's metaphysics had nothing of that disinterested knowledge that usually accompanies the Greek philosopher; on the contrary, his ideas stimulated the minority to seek the truth and to manage their lives and community differently.<sup>37</sup>

The spirit theory invented by Plato was very useful for the political aims of the Greeks, who lived amongst a constant stream of political conflicts and for whom war was a powerful tool for imposing obedience, especially to those who were not intellectually qualified to submit themselves to the authority of reason.<sup>38</sup>

Nonetheless, it is essential to remember that the Platonic conceptions of the soul and spirit were built precisely to ensure public obedience to the government of a philosopher-king, and as the parable of the cave describes, these stories about an afterlife of rewards and punishments, which Plato himself obviously did not believe or intend that fellow philosophers would believe,<sup>39</sup> were designed so that the truths which only the philosopher had access could be understood, avoiding the hostility of those who were chained to the shackles of ignorance.<sup>40</sup>

As the heir to this doctrine, Aristotle conceived the theory of the "great chain of life," in which the beings that survive as plants occupy the lowest rung of the scale, above which are sentient beings, conscious and able to experience, followed by spiritual beings that inhabit the higher orders, and finally, above them, occupying the highest rungs, are the deities.

Looking at this conceptual pyramid, we find that Greek men are placed directly below the gods, followed by their wives, who, although considered to be devoid of reason and any sense of justice, share a small measure of spirit (if only for their born status). After the wives come the children and the insane, who, despite possession of a spirit, cannot use it as the result of their underdeveloped mind. Finally, there is the natural slave who has just enough of

a rational spirit to appreciate how to reason but cannot think for himself.<sup>41</sup>

The most interesting premise of this doctrine, however, is how it characterizes animals. According to this schema, even though animals feel pain and pleasure and can learn and experience intellectual phenomena, they lack the ability to think, believe, or reason and, therefore, are unable to distinguish an act of justice from one of injustice, even if this act results in their own loss.

Stoicism shares the Aristotelian position that the universe operates according to a divine plan and that beings are created for the benefit of each other, and just as plants were created to benefit animals, animals were created for the benefit of men.

Indeed, as a consequence of the combination of Homeric fate, with the materialism of the naturalists, the Heraclitean “fire,” the Socratic equivalence of virtue and knowledge, the Platonic devaluation of the body, and the Aristotelian sense of natural “purpose,” Stoicism’s fundamental thesis resigns and accepts the universe’s moral structure as impartial and inevitable.

For the Stoics man embodies the principle and fundamental purpose of the cosmos, and consists of (1) a “passive” substrate or simple “matter” and (2) a breath (*pneûma*) as the material “active” principle, with the sense of purpose, intelligence and reason, as the craftsman’s fire.

Reason is what distinguishes humans from animals and makes them participate in divine nature. All natural life is irrational, and that is why animals cannot be included in the sphere of morality.

In fact, on some points, Stoicism and Aristotle are in opposition to one another; for example, in defense of equality between all human beings, the Stoics believe that slaves and women occupy the same rung as a Greek man, and they are able to rationalize sufficiently to understand the rules of natural law. For this reason, Chrysippus rejected the Aristotelian theory of the natural slave.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, almost a century after Aristotle, Chrysippus would claim that horses and oxen exist only to work for man, in the same way that a pig lives to be slaughtered and served as food.

Panécio of Rhodes and Posidonius of Apamea (Intermediate Stoics) and Epictetus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius (Late Period Stoicism), however, will introduce these ideas into the Roman world and thereby have considerable influence on the developments of the sciences, ethics, and Roman law. Animals, then, had no better luck under the rule of the Caesars.

With the decline of the Roman Empire, however, this philosophical heritage became absorbed into the doctrine of the Catholic Church. The Church's early representatives, St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, argued from the theory of "the great chain of life," discussing the ability of thinking as a spiritual attribute exclusive to man and, therefore, the fundamental difference between him and the other living beings. For these early Christians, in the natural order, the imperfect must always serve the perfect, just as the irrational should serve the rational.

St. Augustine, for example, rebukes those who believe that it is a sin to kill an animal, explaining that it is divine providence that allows the use of these beings according to the order of nature; because "beasts" have no ability to think and, therefore, lack free will, they cannot take part in the politic settlement.<sup>43</sup>

For St. Thomas Aquinas, whose doctrines are the foundations of Medieval thought, in the same way that the lungs exist for the benefit of the heart, all parts of the universe exist for the benefit of everything; in the same way that "the intellectual substance uses others for its own benefit, that is for the perfection of the intellect, which sees the truth as in a mirror, or for the execution of the power and development of this knowledge, and just as a craftsman develops his art conception in corporeal matter, the Man bear the weight his body through an intellectual soul."<sup>44</sup>

The end of the Middle Ages gave way to the Renaissance, an era in which man again became the center of artistic and philosophical concerns, an idea that set the groundwork for the modern attachment to anthropocentrism.

It is important to realize that Renaissance humanism did not embody a sense of humanitarianism; while the tendency was to act humanely,<sup>45</sup> the thrust of political and philosophic thought was the return of man to the center of philosophical concerns, occupying the position that God had dominated in medieval thought.

Indeed, in the first half of the seventeenth century, Descartes radicalized the new, modern philosophy, leading to a new Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition that asserts that language is the only proof that men have a spirit capable of thinking, feeling and reasoning; because animals are incapable of feeling or thinking, they are nothing more than automatons.

According to Descartes even fools, children and deaf-mutes are able to create signals that permit them to be understood by others; a parrot, on the other hand, although it can pronounce certain words, cannot understand these words, thus proving that animals have absolutely no spirit.<sup>46</sup>

Indeed, the mechanistic rationalism of Descartes was conceived under the strong influence of incipient physiology, and enabled society to ignore the “apparent” suffering of animal in experiments made by residents at the famous monastery of Port-Royal, where Descartes himself accomplished several vivisections.

In this context, it is interesting to contrast the theories of another rationalist, Leibniz. For Leibniz, animals are not the product of chaos or putrefaction; rather, they are the consequence of conception. The organic body exists even before it is conceived. Therefore, not only is the soul (mirror of the universe) indestructible, but also the animal itself, although its skin can change.

In his *Monadology*, Leibniz casts beings as living forces, not as machines, although in that union between body and soul, each one follows its own laws: the soul, the law of final causes, and the body, the law of efficient cause or movement, although they agree in the face of the pre-established harmony for all substances, which are representations of a common universe.

Thus, Leibniz believed that the ordinary soul of animals is a mirror or live image of the universe and creation, while the human spirit is an image of divinity. However, the relationship established between God and man is not a relationship such as that one of an inventor with his machine; it is a relationship similar to that of a prince with his subjects or a father with his children.

The sphere of morality should, therefore, include all the spirits that compose the City of God, the most perfect possible State submitted to the most perfect monarch.<sup>47</sup>

From the notion of the spirit, modernity will derive the ultimate reification of the animal. By denying their own animality, that is, the possession of a sensitive soul (*anima*), the Cartesian paradigm, little by little, stripped the animal of its status and turned it into just a simple thing (*res*), a mere object, visible and available.

In English empiricism, in opposition to the rationalists, the mind is conceived as a blank sheet of paper that is gradually filled by knowledge from successive experiences of the senses. This is the first step toward a break with the exaggerated belief that a spiritual world is the exclusive domain of the human species.

While in the rationalist tradition, all knowledge is based on spirituality, Hume's empiricism, for example, identifies the physical and mental activities of animals as very close to those of men. In this context, Hume paves the way for the Darwinian revolution, which will further break with the philosophical barrier built between humans and other species.

Another empiricist, Locke, says that many animals have the possibility to learn and retain the ideas that are brought in their mind, although, in the end, he denies that animals use any general sign or universal ideas, or that they possess the ability to think abstractly or to generate ideas on their own accord, let alone express them with language.

For Locke, even though animals cannot have a complete idea, they are not mere machines; he could not deny that they have some ability to reason, even if that reasoning is only used for the construction of particular ideas about events received directly by the

senses. The ability to build abstract and general ideas is, then, no longer an exclusive feature of men.<sup>48</sup>

This position will find an outspoken critic in Berkeley, because although he admits that there is no evidence that animals use general signs or words to represent universal ideas and that they do not have the ability to think abstractly, most men are also incapable of thinking abstractly, and therefore, we cannot deny humanity on this basis alone.<sup>49</sup>

This is one of the main problems of modern philosophy. According to Hegel, the ability of abstraction is precisely a distinctive characteristic of the ordinary man, and not of the cultivated man. It is the ordinary man who thinks through generalizations when, for example, he envisions in a criminal just this abstract quality, which destroys the rest of humanity present inside him, so that the lower the intellectual level, the more abstract and generalizing is his thinking.<sup>50</sup>

It is that in Hegel, the essence of the spirit is the activity that simultaneously constitutes the product, start and end, and it is this essence that he calls freedom so that the spirit is not a static being, but the negation of everything that threatens to destroy it.

What characterizes the spirit, therefore, is this self-production, this being its own object, this knowledge of itself published by Socrates, and this is what makes man free, unlike animals that do not exist for themselves. The spirit that knows no freedom stands in the position of a slave who contends with slavery once one ignores that this position is inappropriate.

The specific difference between man and animals, therefore, would lie in the fact that only man knows himself, only he is a being that thinks because his reality is identical to his ideality.

Indeed, it is this ability of thinking of himself as a "self" that enables man to control his instincts, replacing the demands of satisfaction by the realm of thought, unlike animals where those kingdoms coincide, and only through pain and fear can be controlled. Shortly, as a spirit, man does not have an immediate

existence if he is not essentially inward-looking, and this mediation function is an essential moment of the spirit.<sup>51</sup>

For Schopenhauer, even the least and smallest of the animals has conscience of its “self,” its world, and its non-self, and to prove that, it would be enough that a Cartesian got into the cage of a tiger to realize the difference that animal perceives between the “self” and “non-self.”<sup>52</sup>

We owe a very particular position on this issue to Kant because, although his transcendental idealism seeks a reconciliation between the disputes among rationalists and empiricists, according to him, nothing morally prevents animals from being the object of human labor, consumption or destruction.

For Kant, animals are not self-conscious, and therefore, they exist only as instrument to an end, and that end is the man, so our duties towards animals are merely indirect.<sup>53</sup>

Another doctrine that deserves mention is the dialectical materialism of Marx, who believed that the human species is characterized by having a spiritual nature, capable of taking other species - and herself - as an object of knowledge. Although man needs the inorganic nature (food, heat, clothing, housing, etc.) to survive, it is the conscious and free activity that characterizes him because animal life is mere existence.

Man, on the other hand, makes his living activity the object of his desire and conscience, he demonstrates his consciousness by working on the inorganic nature of the creation of a world of objects.

Marx said that although the animals build nests, houses, etc., they only produce what they need for their immediate activities or their offspring, while man produces even when he is free of physical needs.

However, the animal produces only in accordance with the standard of its kind, while man produces according to the standards of all kinds, so man is doubled not only through the conscience and intellect, but also in reality by creating his own physical world.<sup>54</sup>

What is that which we call reason, that which humans boast of themselves so much for having? Does it really constitute the essence of thought or of God, or rather, as Elizabeth Costello affirms of John Coetzee, she is only “the essence of human thought, or worse, just the essence of a trend of human thought.”<sup>55</sup>

Reason is understood today as the ability to see and to respond to relationships; in other words, the ability to insert itself in its true understanding, whereas intelligence is the possibility whereby activities are adapted to new circumstances through experiences and associations.

According to Lloyd Morgan, individual experience, association and imitation are the primary sources of intelligence, while explanation and intentional adaptations are reason’s purpose, by which we can notice right and wrong, adapting conduct based on the understanding of relationships involved.

Thus, relational rationality is a skill based on memory, which perceives and uses relationships, while deliberative rationality requires the individual to be introspective and self-conscious; in addition, it possesses the ability to talk about language (metalinguage), which is a characteristic only of humans and certain primates, although many humans with mental disabilities do not have this ability.<sup>56</sup>

According to Hume, both men and animals “learn many things from experience and infer that these events will always derive from the same causes”; animals, children, the ordinary man, and even philosophers in their working lives are not guided by the reasoning in their inferences.

The difference between human reason and animal reason is no different than the degree to which reason appears in humans; that is, the same, astute ability to reason that causes some men to surpass others in attention, memory, and observation is simply inferior in animals.

Thus, any experimental ratiocination is instinctive and acts in us without being recognized, and it is this same instinct that

teaches man to avoid fire, just like teaching a bird to incubate and nurture their descendants.<sup>57</sup>

For Hume, the object of experience is the content of consciousness (perception), so that the impressions, that is, sensitive and internal perceptions, such as feelings, emotions and acts of will manifest themselves in the spirit, while ideas or thoughts are copies of impressions, such as reflection, remembrance and imagination. Thus, the difference between them is simply the degree of intensity, where pain is the impression and the remembrance of pain is the idea.

## 5. The language of the mind

Conceptual metaphorical speech is indeed adequate to the activity of thinking, the operations of our mind, but the life of the soul in its very intensity is much more adequately expressed in a glance, a sound, a gesture, than in speech. Hannah Arendt<sup>58</sup>

At an International Seminar held in 2000, in Cortona (Tuscany), Italy, scientists concluded that the history of language is long, tracing its origins back some 65 million years, when shrews, small insect-eating mammals, began to climb the trees in the forests to better adapt to the environment. These shrews developed binocular, three-dimensional, color vision, and mastered the use of an opposable thumb, both advances that facilitated the survival of the species.<sup>59</sup> Without the development of these two characteristics, millions of years later, humans, who descended from that animal, could never have developed language, once the absence of a three-dimensional, color vision would make it impossible for them to understand their environment and communicate with others, for example, to inform others of where they had found food.

Moreover, without the opposable thumb, the hand would not have developed locomotion or permitted *Australopithecus*

*afarensis* to take the stance. Free of that function, the hand freed the mouth from the task of handling food, and after several anatomical changes related to stance, the mouth became available for other actions, such as speech.

Furthermore, the development of an opposable thumb and fingers allowed the hands to share their tasks, the right hand was responsible for handling objects (food, sticks, stones) and the left hand for spatial location.

This lateralization of the brain in primates allowed the left hemisphere of the cerebral cortex to coordinate the movements with the right side and vice versa; in time, the left side of the brain took control of the mechanism of language.

Many scientists believe that 15 million years ago, the African forests receded, giving way to grasslands, forcing some species to live in a new habitat, while others stayed in the small remaining forests. Those that remained in the forest had a rich concentration of plant foods around them and developed a powerful masticatory apparatus, as we have in today's great apes, to take advantage of the vegetables available to them for consumption. The ancestors of humans, however, are those who lived in large savannahs and not the forest. These animals developed a more sophisticated mental map of their landscape and thus increased their brain tissue, which, in turn, caused changes in the shape and size of the skull and face.

As a result of the changes to the face/head and the animal's ability to stand, the *medulla oblongata*, which connects the brain tissue to spinal nerve tissue, was no longer flat but upright, causing the larynx (the hollow of the neck) to sink and bring the tongue with it.

This change was crucial to the development of the speech because it allowed the larynx to become an improved sounding box and for the tongue to have more space in the mouth. These two changes were essential to the functioning of man's vocal tract, allowing him to make approximately fifty basic sounds that would later be combined to form speech.

Moreover, in the savannah, because there was less food available, hominids began to maintain themselves by hunting large animals, and thus they were forced to learn to act in groups and to use instruments.

Indeed, it was the necessity to teach others the use of instruments and to divide labor that made anthropoids develop, at least initially, a sign language; to free their hands of this task, they developed what nowadays we call oral language.

Nietzsche asserted that language and self-consciousness are interdependent concepts because the problem of self-consciousness appears to man when he realizes his disposability, and he understands that it is possible to think, feel, will, remember and even to act without using consciousness.

The consciousness' astuteness and strength are proportional to the capacity of man or animal communication, and this capacity is proportional to the need for communication, so the more often man finds himself in danger, the greater is the impulse to develop his communication skills and active self-consciousness.

Nietzsche believed that man is a vulnerable animal, and because of this vulnerability, he needed the help of his companions for protection; eventually, this need for assistance forced him to devise a means to express his discomfort. In other words, man "had to make himself understood"; self-consciousness created the need for communication. Despite the fact that speech is only a small, superficial element of the human spirit, the demand for it only underscores the mediocrity of the flock.<sup>60</sup>

Very close to the rationalists and, therefore, to the Greek world, Heidegger says that "the animal has no world or environment (*Das Tier hat keine Welt, auch keine Umwelt*)," and aimed to prove that the animal's world is spiritual, but because an animal does not consent to this world, it, in truth, has no spiritual world.

However, the Biannual Conferences held during the winter of 1929-1930 in Fribourg, when Derrida was still his student, in response to the question "What is the world," Heidegger pre-

sented these metaphysical theses: 1. The stone is without the world (*weltlos*); 2. The animal is poor of the world (*weltarm*); 3. Man is the maker of the world (*weltbildend*).<sup>61</sup>

Derrida would later question the meaning of *weltarm* because the German word for poverty (*Armut*) can represent a difference in degree between poverty and wealth (*Reichtum*). Is this also the case with *weltarm*? If the world is spiritual and the animal is poor of spirit while the man is rich, would not the animal, even in a limited degree, have a spirit, unlike the stone, which has no spirit (*weltlos*) at all?

However, as Heidegger says that animals are deprived of the world, meaning that they “have no world,” it is necessary to distinguish “the animal being deprived of the world” from the “non-existence of the stone’s world” and “having a man’s world,” because for Heidegger this is not a degree difference, as in Darwin or Schopenhauer, but a difference of essence. The reason why the animal is deprived, or absent of spirit / world (*Entbehrung*), is that the animal has another kind of connection entirely.<sup>62</sup>

The animal’s deprivation of a world (*Nicht-haben von Welt*) is radically different from the stone’s circumstance, which is without world entirely (*weltlos*), meaning that the “not-having” of a world is, in fact, a manner of having it; the animal is deprived of the world because it can have a world, and this apparent logical contradiction (the animal is deprived of a world and the animal has a world) brings Heidegger’s dialectic closer to that of Hegel.

The essence of man, therefore, is not found in the organic (scientifically explained) body, in the immortal soul, in the force of reason, or in the character of a person, but, rather, in ec-sistence. The meaning of this term is different than *existentia* (reality), which is the opposite of *essentia* because it refers to the Truth of Being.<sup>63</sup>

A stone has no access to being, while the animal accepts being, although the animal does not consent to being itself in the

manner that man does. For instance a lizard that sits on a rock, under the sun, does not regard the rock or the sun in the same way that it sees itself—that is, as a creature who can communicate. Therefore, the distance between a living animal and man is greater than that between the stone and the lizard because the animal is not only closed to being, it is closed to the openness of being.<sup>64</sup>

Thus, for Heidegger, there is no animal pre-sence (*Da-sein*) because, although an animal finds itself in tension with its environment, it will never develop the ability of “clearing of being”, because it lacks a language, which is the advent of being itself, and cannot clear or hide its own.<sup>65</sup>

This is based on the same logic as Aristotle who, even without accepting Plato’s doctrine, follows it for the most part in that he separates the theoretical (*bios theoretikós*) way of life from a life devoted to human affairs (*bios politikós*).<sup>66</sup>

Indeed, by conceiving of man as a *zoon politikon*, meaning a “living being gifted with the speech” (*zoon logon ekhon*, mistakenly translated into Latin as *animale rationale*), Aristotle did not intend to define man in general, nor to indicate that speech or reason (*logos*) is its highest capacity. For him, the capacity for contemplation (*nous*) was the most important factor distinguishing man from barbarians, slaves, and animals. These blighted figures, for Aristotle, were *aneu logou*, the destitute, not in that they lack the ability to speak but destitute in that speech is the main concern of their lives: the *vita activa*.<sup>67</sup>

This spiritual absence in animals implies the lack of speech and the ability to communicate through “conventional signs”; while men use artificial signs, animals are limited to instinctive and natural signs, which are the essence of the soul.<sup>68</sup>

In this conception, language emphasizes the freedom of man to allow generalization, reflection, and conceptualization, leading him to different mental places and times, thus justifying his participation in the sphere of morality. It is in this difference between the propositional language of symbols that designates

or describes objects, and the emotional language of signs, the mere involuntary expression of feelings, that Cassirer seeks to find the true boundary between the human world and animal world.<sup>69</sup>

According to biologist Johannes von Uexkull, each organism is not only adapted (*angepasst*) but also fully adjusted (*eigenpasst*) to their environment. According to its anatomical structure, each organism also has a receptor of external stimulus (*Merknetz*) and an executor system that reacts to them (*Wirknetz*), a process that forms a single chain that he calls the functional circle (*Funktionskreis*). This process then reveals the complexity of the human communicative system. Man has adapted biologically to the need for language by developing a symbolic system. Therefore, there are two, distinct types of human emotive reactions, one that is direct and immediate, an organic response, and the constructed human response, which is delayed or interrupted by the thought process. This constructed response is complicated by thought because man is not only a physical being but also an actor in a symbolic universe that is constructed of language, myth, art and religion; for this reason, Cassirer believes that we “should define man not as *animal rationale*, but as *animal symbolicum*.”<sup>70</sup>

Nonetheless, is language itself an attribute capable of giving men a moral and special right? Have there not been human tribes who have been thought to be devoid of language until it was discovered that they had a very sophisticated language?<sup>71</sup>

Moreover, several empirical studies conducted by primatologists, ethnologists, and psychologists have reached controversial conclusions about the development and use of language – conclusions that are often starkly different from the conclusions of many philosophers. Experiences such as those performed with Washoe, for example, a baby chimpanzee raised as if it were a deaf child, demonstrated that animals are not only able to learn American Sign Language but can teach it to their descendants. Washoe, for example, was filmed making signs to herself with-

out anyone present; that is, she was “talking” to herself. In addition to this, some chimpanzees have obtained a score between 75 and 85 on standard IQ tests.

In a similar experiment, the gorilla Koko acquired a vocabulary of more than a thousand words. In another experiment, Chantek, an orangutan, developed the ability to lie, or manipulate his handlers using language. In one incident, Chantek stole an eraser and lied with sign language, saying that he was going to “eat food” in his cage; instead of eating, Chantek hid the object in his cage, concealing the theft.<sup>72</sup>

Thus, empirical science has discovered linguistic abilities in apes that have significant implication on moral theory. These studies demonstrate that the traditional doctrine that sees human species as ontologically distinct from animals is fundamentally wrong and inconsistent.

## 6. Conclusion

The soul example, if anything serves the opposite of its intended purpose – it does not exclude animals from moral concern, but rather gives us some grounds for including them and even giving them pride of place. Bernard Rollin<sup>73</sup>

We would like to conclude this work by stating that animals are not deprived of spirit or mental activities and that they are able to communicate through a prescriptive symbolic language. We have only discussed a few examples of the empirical research that shows that animals possess attributes that normally are considered as exclusive of the spirit (*mind*) life. However, these cases alone should force us, as a morally healthy society, to include animals in the human, moral community, with all the benefits that that implies.

The evidence of animal spirituality should lead us to recognize its sacred character so that we will see not only our biological similarities with animals but also spiritual similarities.

In the end, we could develop a logical synthesis such as (a) Every spiritual being thinks abstractly, (b) animals think abstractly, (c) therefore, the animal is a spiritual being or (1) every spiritual being communicates through a symbolic language, (2) animals communicate through symbolic language, (3) consequently, animals are spiritual beings.

The purpose of this essay, however, was not to do this type of analysis but, rather, to face the metaphysical problems that arise when one tries to define the spirit and determine if it is accessible to animals. In assessing the definition of the spirit bequeathed to us by the Greek philosophical tradition, we have already found a number of logical contradictions. As we have seen, animals are excluded from moral consideration by simply stating that there are metaphysical or practical differences between humans and animals. The key point is if these differences should be morally relevant and rationally defensible enough to exclude animals from the sphere of morality.

The concept of spirit, however, should serve precisely the opposite goal and provide the foundation not only to include animals in the sphere of morality but also to give them a prominent place in it.

Differences among people such as their race, sex, mental condition, generational affiliation, religious belief or identity, and cognitive abilities do not justify the exclusion of anyone from the sphere of moral consideration. Further more, if Aristotle and Plato admit that the spirit of a man may reincarnate into the body of an animal, how can one argue that a spiritual life is man's right alone? According to their logic, should we assume that there would be some animals with spirit and not others? This statement appears to violate the logical principles of identity.

Inconsistencies abound in this debate. For instance, Descartes' theory of automatons denies that animals can feel pain or pleasure. It would be hard, in the modern world, to find a physiologist who would uphold this theory.

In the same way, it seems that even the doctrine that animals eat other species because they have no concept of justice is also inconsistent. That is, if men are the only beings who have a sense of what is fair, why do they insist on insulting, enslaving, subduing, and killing other species?

For this doctrine to be consistent, the following must logically follow:

1. Every animal is deprived of spirit, and as they are not able to distinguish what is right and what is wrong, they eat other animals.

2. Men are not deprived of spirit, and therefore they can distinguish what is right and what is wrong.

3. Thus, men are not animals, and therefore they should not eat other animals.

These logical contradictions do not demonstrate, however, that the moral foundation of speciesist humanism, which excludes animals from the moral community with the argument that they are deprived of the ability to think and symbolically communicate, is inconsistent and logically untenable. Indeed, if animals operated solely on instinct, then they could never be tamed, and if the human spirit always led people to act fairly, then it would never permit cruel practices to be enacted against defenseless beings.

## 7. Notas

<sup>1</sup> HOMER. *Odyssey*. Book 10, lines 198-250.

<sup>2</sup> RYDER, Richard. *Animals and Human Rights*. In: Heron Gordilho e Luciano Santana (Coord) *Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal*. Ano 3. Número 4 jan/dez . 2008, p.63.

<sup>3</sup> DURKHEIM, Emile. *The Elementary Form f Religious Life*, 242

<sup>4</sup> DURKHEIM, Émile. *As formas elementares de vida religiosa: o sistema totêmico na Austrália*. Trad. Joaquim Pereira neto. São Paulo: Ed. Paulinas, 1989, p. 93.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, ps. 82-83.

- <sup>6</sup> KELSEN, Hans. *A Ilusão da Justiça*. Trad. Sérgio Tellaroli. São Paulo: Martins Fontes. 2000, p.331
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, p. 333- 334
- <sup>8</sup> Junito Bransão. *Mitologia Grega*, pp. 145-146.
- <sup>9</sup> In Nicola Abgnano, *Dicionário de Filosofia*, p. 25.
- <sup>10</sup> Hannah Arendt. *The Life of the Mind*. Vol 1. Thinking, p. 56.
- <sup>11</sup> Aristotle. On the soul. Part 2. Translated by J. A. Smith. Disponível em <http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/soul.html>. Capturado em 09/24/2011.
- <sup>12</sup> Émile Durkheim, *Formas elementares de vida religiosa: o sistema totêmico na Austrália*, p. 89-96.
- <sup>13</sup> João Maurício Adeodato. *The Problem of Legitimacy: On the Trail of Thought by Hannah Arendt*. p. 141.
- <sup>14</sup> Junito Brandão. *Mitologia Grega*, p. 147.
- <sup>15</sup> Hans Kelsen. *The Illusion of Justice*, p 328.
- <sup>16</sup> Unlike Durkheim, for whom the idea of a soul preceded the soul of the dead (spirit), see Hans Kelsen. *The Illusion of Justice*, p 332: “Originally, moreover, the soul of life was imagined as an entity distinct from the soul of the dead. The unification of both the notion of a soul responsible for human life and at the same time having an existence prolonged beyond death is the last phase of the development of belief in the soul, which even at this stage does not lose its ethical.”
- <sup>17</sup> See Plato. *Dialogues*, p. 132: “– Yes, without doubt, Cebes, and is also very likely that they are not the souls of good, but the souls of the wicked who are forced to wander through these places where they pay the penalty of his first life, which was bad, and where they continue wandering until, by their love of the body mass that always follows, come to join the same habits that have been squatting in his first life. – How is it Socrates? – I mean, for example, Cebes, those who enjoyed only intemperance without shame, without any restraint, actually enters the bodies of animals like donkeys and not believe?”
- <sup>18</sup> Bertrand Russell. *History of Western Philosophy*, p. 159-160.
- <sup>19</sup> Hans Kelsen. *Op. cit*, p. 341.

- <sup>20</sup> Plato. Diálogos. Translated by Márcio Pugliesi e Edson Bini. São Paulo: Húmus, 1981. p. 130.
- <sup>21</sup> Aristotle, The Soul (De Anima), p. 112-113: “Men often back off from science to follow your imagination, the other animals, by contrast, have neither intelligence or thought, they have only imagination.”
- <sup>22</sup> Aristotle. *Cit.*, p. 55: “But in the mind and the faculty of thinking nothing is clear: there appears to be a different kind of soul, only admitting she be separated from how it is that which is immortal, that which perishes.”
- <sup>23</sup> Joao Mauricio Adeodato. *Cit.*, p. 134/135: “a little too precise terminology of Hannah Arendt, and perhaps explained by the increased distance of their work in time – almost twenty years separate The Human Condition of The Life of the Mind – can be a source of confusion for the unwary reader and even to scholars of unquestionable competence, since the concentration of a given point can lose sight of the whole and lead to conflicting interpretations”
- <sup>24</sup> Celso Lafer. Hannah Arendt: Thinking, Persuasion and Power, p. 86-87.
- <sup>25</sup> Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition, p. 26-29.
- <sup>26</sup> Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition, p. 30.
- <sup>27</sup> Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Monadology, p. 240.
- <sup>28</sup> In Abbagnano, Nicola, *Op. cit.* p. 337.
- <sup>29</sup> João Mauricio Adeodato. Filosofia do direito: uma crítica à verdade na ética e na ciência (através de um exame da ontologia de Nicolai Hartmann), p. 117-118.
- <sup>30</sup> Hannah Arendt. The Life of the Mind. Vol 1. Thinking, p. 57.
- <sup>31</sup> Hannah Arendt. *Op. cit.* p. 34.
- <sup>32</sup> CLARK, Stephen. The Moral Status of Animals. p.133
- <sup>33</sup> Cavalieri, Paola. The Animal Question: Why Nonhuman Animals Deserve Human Rights, p.70.
- <sup>34</sup> Hans Kelsen. *Op cit.* pp. 329: “In large measure that the soul is immortal product of such ethical and religious speculation, and therefore essentially social orientation – and not primarily a hypothesis based on natural science, seeking clarification of life processes – shows up with

the maximum sharpness in fact be attributed exclusively to men, while, with regard to animals and plants, they also living beings, there is a tendency to give them a soul, and thus immortality.”

- <sup>35</sup> Denys Page. *The Homeric World*, pp.19.
- <sup>36</sup> A H M Jones. *Athens and Sparta*, p. 70-74: “The Athenians saw the draw as one of the cornerstones of democracy. The election was seen by them as a process before aristocratic than democratic, because the man who had her name, wealth, position or easy word usually win, and the common man had little chance.” For Socrates “It is absurd that the city rulers are indicated by luck, when no one would dare to employ a driver or a carpenter or flute player chosen in luck, although the errors that are much less harmful than errors in public policy.”
- <sup>37</sup> A H Armstrong. *The Greeks and their philosophy*, p. 19.
- <sup>38</sup> Will Durant. *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, p. 28-29. For Nietzsche, Socrates and Plato on the contrary represent relaxation and the decay of the Greek character: “In its youth a nation produces poetry and mythology, in its decadence, logic and philosophy. In youth the Greeks produced Homer and Aeschylus, in the decadence she gave us Euripides, the friend of Socrates, who replaced the Dionysian chorus by the Apollonic galaxy of dialectics.”
- <sup>39</sup> Hannah Arendt. *Between the Past and the Future*, p. 147.
- <sup>40</sup> Hannah Arendt. *Between the Past and the Future*, pp.151: “Given the enormous influence that these stories had on the images of hell in religious thought, has some importance to note that they were originally designed for purely political purposes. In Plato, they are simply a clever ruse to enforce obedience to those who are not subject to the coercive power of reason, without actually using physical violence.”
- <sup>41</sup> Aristotle. *Politics*, pp. 24: “The free man orders the slave in a different way of husband to wife, from father to son. The elements of soul are in each of these beings, but to different degrees. The slave is completely deprived of the power of will, the woman has, but weak, the son is incomplete.”
- <sup>42</sup> Steven Wise. *Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals*, p.14.
- <sup>43</sup> Tom Regan. Introduction. In *Political Theory and Animal Rights*, p. XIV.

- <sup>44</sup> Anton C. Pegis (Tr) *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, p. 222
- <sup>45</sup> Peter Singer. *Ethical Life*, p.198.
- <sup>46</sup> René Descartes. *Discourse on Method*, pp.105-107. To the author: “There is no other that much away from the faint straight path of virtue as that which resides in the souls of animals assumed to be similar to ours and take it to the conclusion that we have nothing to fear nor to expect after this life, just like flies and ants, and when, on the contrary, we know how different they are, to understand better the reasons that prove that our nature is completely independent of the body and is not therefore subject to die with him: for that, seeing no other cause to destroy that, we are led, of course, to conclude that it is immortal.”
- <sup>47</sup> Leibniz. *Op. Cit*, p. 259-71.
- <sup>48</sup> John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human*, pp.88-91.
- <sup>49</sup> *A New Theory of Vision and other Select Philosophical Writings, Everyman end* (London: Dent, 1910) p. 98-101.
- <sup>50</sup> Hegel, *Who thinks abstractly*, p. 170.
- <sup>51</sup> Hegel. *Lecture on the Philosophy of World History*, p. 48-51.
- <sup>52</sup> Schopenhauer. *On the Basis of Morals*, p. 167: “The moral motivation for me set it is confirmed, moreover, a genuine by the fact that she takes under her protection but also animals that are so irresponsibly bad health care in moral systems in Europe. The apparent absence of animal rights, the illusion that our actions against them are without moral significance, there is no law in relation to animals, is directly rawness and a revolting barbarism of the West, whose source is in Judaism. In philosophy, it rests on the total difference was admitted in spite of all evidence, between man and animal, which was, as we know, the more determined and expressed strongly by Cartesius (Descartes) as a necessary consequence of their error. How indeed, Cartesian philosophy Leibniz-built wolfiana rational psychology from abstract concepts and built an “*anima rationalis*” immortal, objected, then, of course, natural to the claims of the animal world this exclusive privilege of this patent and the immortality of the human species and the nature protested silently, as in all similar occasions.”
- <sup>53</sup> Kant. *Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 345-346.

- <sup>54</sup> Marx. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 163-166.
- <sup>55</sup> Coetzee. The Life of Animals, p. 10.
- <sup>56</sup> Thomas Kelch. Toward a non-property status for animal, p. 9.
- <sup>57</sup> David Hume. Research on Human Understanding, p.102-105.
- <sup>58</sup> Hannah Arendt. *The Life of the Mind*. p.
- <sup>59</sup> Superinteressante, *Palavra de Homem*, pp. 68-72.
- <sup>60</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche. The Joyful Wisdom (The Gay Science) [1882] Trad. Thomas Common (London: T. N. Foulis, 1910) p. 296-300, n. 354.
- <sup>61</sup> Derrida. Do Espírito: Heidegger e a Questão, p.60.
- <sup>62</sup> Derrida. Op. cit. p.61.
- <sup>63</sup> Heidegger. About Humanism, p. 44: "One can assume that, of all beings, who are the living, is for us, the more difficult to be thought. For if on one hand, it is the closest, on the other hand, is separate from our Essence ec-sistent by an abyss. It seems to us until the Essence of the Divine is closer to the stranger to be alive, closer, namely, a distance of Essence, which, like distance, is more familiar to our essence and c-sistent than the kinship abyss of our body with the animal, we can hardly think through."
- <sup>64</sup> Derrida. Op. cit. p. 65.
- <sup>65</sup> Heidegger. *Op cit*, p. 40-42. "The man's body is something essentially different from an animal organism. Not overcome the mistake of biologism, adding to the man's body and soul to soul, mind and spirit, the existent, not because they proclaim louder than before, an appreciation of the spirit, for, soon after reduce everything to the experience of life, ensuring a warning, which, with its rigid concepts, thought destroys the flow of life and thought of Being misrepresents existence."
- <sup>66</sup> Hannah Arendt. Between the Past and the Future, p. 156.
- <sup>67</sup> Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition, p. 36.
- <sup>68</sup> Aristotle, The Politics, p. 13: "Man alone, among all animals, has the gift of speech, the voice is the sign of pain and pleasure, and that's why she was also given to other animals. They come to experience feelings of pain and pleasure, and to make people understand each other. The word, however, is intended to make people understand what is useful or harmful, and, consequently, what is just or unjust. What distinguishes

man from a particular way is that he knows how to discern good from evil, right from wrong, and so all the feelings of the same order the disclosure of which is precisely the family state.”

- <sup>69</sup> Ernst Cassirer. *Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture*, p. 55-56.
- <sup>70</sup> Ernst Cassirer. *Op Cit.* p. 45-50. To the author: “The reason is a very inadequate term with which to understand the forms of cultural life of man in all its richness and variety. But all these forms are symbolic forms. Therefore, we should define it as *animal symbolicum*. In doing so, we can designate his specific difference, and understand the new way open to man - the path to civilization.”
- <sup>71</sup> Thomas Kelch. *Op. Cit*, p. 8.
- <sup>72</sup> Peter Singer. *Op. cit.*, p.110.
- <sup>73</sup> Bernard Rollin. *Moral Theory and Animals*, p. 29