Resumo

Quando os militares assumiram o poder em 1964, justificaram a sua intervenção com uma ameaça para segurança nacional e desenvolvimento econômico. O “desenvolvimentismo” liberal parecia ser arruinado. Brasil e os outros países do Cone Sul demonstraram que o processo de modernização não devia levar, quase inevitavelmente, à democracia pluralista, como alguns teóricos tinham prognosticado. Ao contrário, em países em vias de desenvolvimento, com um alto grau de heterogeneidade estrutural, esta modernização (conservador) podia resultar numa ditadura de tipo “burocrático-autoritário” e demobilizador que seguiria um “modelo de desenvolvimento associado-dependente”. Porém, já nos anos setenta do século passado cientistas políticos e economistas começaram a discutir de novo o caráter aparentemente inovador do sistema político e do modelo de desenvolvimento dos militares. Philip Schmitter e Thomas E. Skidmore realçaram as continuidades entre o Estado Novo de Getúlio Vargas e o autoritarismo burocrático. Outros acadêmicos defenderam o seu ponto de vista segundo o qual a Doctrina de Segurança Nacional, a base politico-ideológica do golpe de 1964, foi o produto da Escola Superior de Guerra e, portanto, do período de pós-guerra. Este artigo retoma a tese de Schmitter e Skidmore e aplica-a à formação de um Estado de segurança nacional. Eu quero argumentar que os têrmos de “segurança nacional” e “desenvolvimento econômico” foram introduzidos já alguns anos antes da instalação do Estado Novo e sustituíram o binômio positivista de “ordem e progresso”. Ainda que o surgimento do populismo e o começo da Guerra Fria contribuíssem à elaboração e reinterpretação do conceito original de segurança nacional, a ESG podia partir do legado Varguista.

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Abstract

When the Brazilian military took power in 1964, they justified their intervention by pointing to a threat to both national security and economic development. Liberal desenvolvimentismo seemed to be bankrupt. Brazil and other countries of the Cono Sur proved that modernisation did not inevitably lead to democracy, as some theorists had prognosticated. On the contrary, in take-off countries with a high degree of structural heterogeneity it could result in a new, “bureaucratic-authoritarian” type of dictatorship which demobilised and depoliticised society and embraced a model of “associated-dependent development.” However, it would not take long before social scientists and economists began to debate how new the military’s polity and their development model actually were. Philip Schmitter and Thomas E. Skidmore emphasised the continuities between Getúlio Vargas’s Estado Novo and the new bureaucratic authoritarianism. Other scholars continued to stress that the military’s Doctrine of National Security, the rationale for the 1964 coup, was rooted in the Escola Superior de Guerra and therefore remained a product of the post-war period. This article takes up Schmitter’s and Skidmore’s thesis and applies it to the formation of a national security state. I want to argue that the terms of “national security” and “economic development” were introduced long before the installation of the Estado Novo and replaced the positivist binomial of “order” and “progress”. Although the emergence of populism and the beginning of the Cold War would contribute to a further elaboration and reinterpretation of the original concept of national security, the ESG could build upon Vargas’s legacy.

Palavras-chave

Estado de Segurança Nacional - modelos de desenvolvimento - positivismo - Estado Novo - ditadura militar - Rio Grande do Sul - exército

Keywords


When the Brazilian military took power in 1964, they justified their intervention by pointing to a threat to both national security and economic development. Liberal developmentalism, with its belief in ‘universalistic and unilinear progression toward a
good society’ and its extrapolation from European and U.S. models, seemed to be bankrupt (Martz/Myers, 1992: 265). Brazil and other countries of the Cono Sur proved that modernisation did not inevitably lead to democracy, as both Rostow and Lipset had prognosticated. On the contrary, in relatively backward and dependent countries with a high degree of structural heterogeneity it could result in a demobilising and depoliticising dictatorship. Guillermo O’Donnell (1980) coined the term ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ for the regime the military established, while Dieter Nohlen and his students (Nohlen/Thibaut, 1992: 66-67) spoke of a ‘new military regime’. For Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1973), the insurgent generals embraced a new economic strategy of ‘associated-dependent development’ combining domestic and foreign capital under the auspices of a modernising State (see also: Evans 1979). However, during Brazil’s long abertura, social scientists (Cammack 1985; Lauth 1985) and economists (Thorp, 1984: 13-14; Sangmeister, 1992: 273-4) began to debate how new the polity of the military dictatorship and its development model actually were. Given that the 1964 coup d’état marked the beginning of a critical realignment in South America, an answer to this question was of importance not only in Brazil but also regionally.

While a number of historians traced authoritarian-patrimonial rule back to the Old Republic, the Empire, or even the colonial period, Philip Schmitter (1973: 182) and Thomas E. Skidmore (1973: 38-43) emphasised the continuities between Getúlio Vargas’s Estado Novo (1937-45) and ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism.’ Others continued to argue that the military’s Doctrine of National Security, the rationale for the 1964 coup, was rooted in the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), founded in 1949, and therefore represented a product of the post-war period. It was not seen as a continuation of Vargas’s policy but rather as a departure from it.

In this paper, I intend to take up Schmitter’s and Skidmore’s thesis and apply it to the formation of a national security state. I want to argue that the terms ‘national security’ and ‘economic development’ were introduced long before the installation of the Estado Novo and replaced the Positivist binomial ‘order and progress’ which had characterised the country’s transition from monarchy to republic and Rio Grande do Sul’s Castilhismo. Although the emergence of populism and the beginning of the Cold War would contribute to a further elaboration and reinterpretation of the concept of national security, the Supreme War College could build upon Vargas’s legacy.
My study is divided into four sections. First, I shall examine how the military legitimised their 1964 coup. In the second step, I will analyse the institutionalisation of the Doctrine of National Security until the consolidation of an authoritarian polity in 1969. From this basis, a retrospective view can be taken of how state security was defined and organised under Vargas’s dictatorial regime. Finally, the adjustment of this concept to new domestic and international conditions after 1945 has to be explored. The conclusion will focus on functional equivalents in the formation of the two national security states. In this paper, I will place emphasis on the institutional, rather than the personal and structural, dimension of ‘violence’ (Waldmann, 1977) and highlight the political-ideological aspects of ‘culture’.

1. Brazil’s Regeneration: Rationale for the 1964 Coup

By the late 1950s, import-substituting industrialisation (ISI), which had begun after the Great Depression and converted Brazil into a take-off country, entered a cul-de-sac. Consumer durables could now be produced domestically but a large-scale replacement of capital good importations depended on an increase in foreign investment and the latter in turn on an abandonment of rigid economic nationalism. Furthermore, even in its first stage, ISI had not been guided by domestic mass demand nor did it stimulate the exportation of national products. Industries were internationally uncompetitive, had a restricted internal market, and accumulated debts with suppliers of intermediary products. Brazilian society had remained regionally and socially distorted. The agrarian sector suffered from the unilateral macro-economic orientation towards industrialisation. Neither the traditional nor the modern capital-intensive branches of industry, which already produced their own labour surplus, were able to further absorb rural migrants. As a consequence, the agrarian question was aggravated. The foundation of peasant leagues in the Northeast, supported by Communists, trade unionists, leftist intellectuals, liberation theologians, and populist politicians, caused concern among Brazil’s conservative classes. When rural workers began to demand their ‘1930’, it became obvious that the populist pact which Vargas had created between State and urban proletariat was clearly overstretched. His heir João Goulart, faced with an annual inflation rate of more than 100 percent, a considerable government deficit, and a decrease in economic growth, had insufficient revenue for a redistributive policy in favour of the urban and rural masses. Nonetheless, he promised ‘basic reforms’ in the agrarian sector, banking, tax and the electoral system. Though this was rather meant as a
preventative measure against a possible revolutionary threat (with regard to his attitude towards entrepreneurs, see Toledo, 1994: 33) and for some leftist analysts did not go far enough (Frank, 1969: 348), his enemies, among them the military, felt the opposite was the case: Goulart would actually prepare the ground for a leftist coup against the country’s democratic institutions and (already restricted) market economy. Similarly, U.S. officials were obsessed with the possible emergence of a second Cuba and a terreiromundismo policy following decolonisation in Africa.

A small circle of high-ranking ESG graduates, who were also linked to a private conservative think tank, the Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais, formed what Dulles (1980: 21) called an ‘estado-maior informal’, i.e. a co-ordinating centre for a possible coup: Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco, Ernesto Geisel, Golbery do Couto e Silva, and Ademar de Queirós (see also Abreu, 2001: 1215ff). This group was horrified by the increasing mass mobilisation instigated by Communists and populist demagogues and ranked the elimination of this domestic threat to the existing social and economic order higher than the army’s more conventional task of national defence. For the ESG, the latter had become part of a wider concept of ‘national security’ which included military, political, psycho-social, and economic instruments to deal with external and internal enemies: training, equipment, and mobilisation of the armed forces and control of the security apparatus in a wider sense; rational institution-building and decision-making procedures; formation of a national consciousness based on a consensus of Christian and democratic [sic] values; formation of capital and its investment in industries, agriculture, infrastructure, and social policies. In this concept, ‘national security’ and ‘economic development’ could not be separated. Without first decapitating the Left, removing populists from power, and placing government authority in the hands of a coalition of patriotic military, apolitical technocrats, and responsible entrepreneurs, the new elite emphasised, it would not be possible to create a new polity and implement an unpopular, but necessary and well thought-through, programme of economic stabilisation. The success of this programme and the consequent generation of high growth rates would then fund a modernisation of the army, allow social reforms, strengthen cohesion in society, and consolidate the political institutions; in short, national security would be cemented. For these ESG disciples, long-term growth depended on embarking on a new ‘development’ model. According to Aarão Reis Filho (2001: 6), ‘they intended to destroy, in its foundations, the national-statist order and traditions which Jango [Goulart] represented and replace them by an internationalist-liberal alternative which focused on
an economic opening towards the international market; incentives for private, including foreign, capital; [and] a different, more regulative than interventionist, role of the State in the economy.’

When the military actually intervened in politics in March 1964 and Castello Branco became president, it was not an individual, but the armed forces as a corporation, who exercised power and focused on a transformation of State and society following ESG guidelines. The State was described as a ‘political-institutional organ or as an instrument of collective well-being’ (Schneider, 1971: 247). It was to define and achieve short-term and permanent national objectives and stand above the antagonisms existing within a historically and culturally mature society. For ESG ideologues, an optimum ‘national policy’ had to take into account the country’s ‘natural’ or ‘supra-social’ conditions such as geography, resources, and infrastructure and to guide ‘government policy.’ Such a concept would distinguish their decision-making from the ‘incrementalism’ which had characterised populist policies (Schneider, 1971: 246-7; Werz, 1992: 122-41). In other words, the ESG was convinced it was the only group to have an alternative policy for rational state and nation-building, output-oriented modernisation of the economy, unification of the country, and achievement of regional great-power status. Moreover, they had the personnel and institutionalised power to implement their strategy. Last but not least, in their self-image, they did not represent a specific social class but the entire nation. Those who attacked them were depicted as the Anti-Nation and became the target of the national security apparatus.

2. The ‘Coup Within the Coup’: The Formation of Brazil’s National Security State by 1968/1969

It should be emphasised once again that the military around Castello Branco did not intervene in politics to abolish the 1946 Constitution but, as they declared, in order to regenerate or ‘purify’ the existing democratic system (Rouquie/Suffern, 1994: 252). Consequently, they called their coup a ‘revolution’ and their regime a ‘democracia guiada’ (Bethell, 1992: 12). Just as in 1889 and 1930 the army considered itself the guardian of the nation. It valued the guarantee (and improvement) of the Constitution higher than the legitimacy of the (elected) government whose politics and policies had undermined the State and left it unprotected. This was a conservative interpretation of the ‘citizen-soldier’ doctrine which had guided Benjamin Constant Botelho de Magalhães and his ‘young officers’ in 1889 and the tenentes in 1930.
The ‘authoritarian liberals’ (Rouquié/ Suffern, 1994: 252) who took over power in 1964 ‘sought to establish a highly centralised technocracy which could provide the requisite institutional conditions for economic planning’ (Schneider, 1971: 113). Castello Branco initially defined his government as temporary. He thought that, once anarchy was overcome and technocratic rule established, (engineered) presidential elections could take place. Moreover, Castello Branco was willing to collaborate with civilians, in particular the União Democrática Nacional (UDN). Those politicians shared the military’s abhorrence of Getulismo and of the parties which administered Vargas’s legacy, the Partido Social-Democrático (PSD) and especially the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB).

Indeed, it was not only parties on the extreme left, most notably Moscow-oriented and Maoist Communists, but also populist leaders and their loyal public servants, trade unionists, and leftist intellectuals who suffered from the promulgation, in 1964, of a first Ato Institucional (AI) allowing amendments to the 1946 Constitution. This Institutional Act was to expire at the end of the presidential term in January 1966 (later extended to 1967). Until 15 June 1964 it authorised the executive to revoke legislative mandates and to deprive citizens of their political rights for a period of up to ten years. 441 Brazilians were affected, among them the three presidents who had followed Vargas in office after his suicide in 1954. In the two months following the coup, police and military arrested between 10,000 and 50,000 people and tortured several hundred for more than two days. However, the government refused demands from hard-line military to extend this witch-hunt beyond the expiry date. Job security in the public services was suspended for six months thereby allowing more time for purges. Not only civilians lost their employment, 122 officers were also forced to retire. Thereafter, however, persecution diminished and censorship was moderate (Skidmore, 1988: 23-7). Finally, still in 1964, the Castello Branco administration created a notorious secret service, the Serviço Nacional de Informação (SNI), headed by General Golbery de Couto, although initially this was to be a civil government body.

The AI-1, which prepared Castello Branco’s election by a purged Congress, marked the first step to a political centralisation and concentration of powers in the executive branch. However, the administration proved unable to hermetically control the country, much to the disgust of hard-liners who considered all civil politicians to be incapable and corrupt and had favoured, from the start, a more permanent role for the armed forces in Brazilian politics. They began to exert pressure on Castello Branco. As a consequence, whenever a possible inroad for the opposition appeared the military
government answered with yet another institutional act which further limited civil liberties and political rights. AI-2, promulgated in October 1965, was a reaction to the unexpected election of two PSD/PTB-supported governors in key states. Though Castello Branco respected their mandates, similar surprises were to be prevented in the future. The institutional act and various complimentary acts which followed gave the government the right to abolish all political parties (including the UDN), to deprive adversaries of their constitutional guarantees and political rights, and to make the election of the president indirect. Moreover, the executive further strengthened its power at the cost of the judiciary branch: it increased the number of judges on the Supreme Court from 11 to 16, further limited the court’s authority to review the actions of the government, and placed crimes by individuals against national security under the jurisdiction of military courts. By the end of 1965 two new parties were founded, the government party Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA) and the ‘opposition’ party Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB). Just four months later, in February 1966, AI-3 required that state assemblies had to choose their governor who would then, after formally consulting the legislative, appoint the prefects of state capital municipalities. With the two new parties in place and purges under way, the legislature had become a mere ‘rubber stamp’ (Burns, 1993: 455-6). The 1967 Constitution ended the experiment in ‘authoritarian liberalism’ and made Brazil a barely disguised dictatorship (Martins 1993; Excerpts 1999).

When a National Security Law (Decree-Law 314) was promulgated on 13 March 1967, coinciding with Castello Branco’s departure from office (15 March), the hard-liners had already set the tone. Article 1 declared: ‘every individual or juridical entity is responsible for national security within the limits defined by the law’ (cited in Skidmore, 1988: 57). These limits were narrow. Castello Branco himself justified the law as an appropriate answer to any attempt at ‘adverse psychological’ or ‘revolutionary warfare’ against the State. The former was defined as ‘the employment of propaganda, counterpropaganda, and actions in the political, economic, psychosocial, and military areas designed to influence or provoke opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of foreign, enemy, neutral, or friendly groups against the attainment of the national objectives’. Warfare was then ‘revolutionary’ when an ‘internal conflict, generally inspired by an ideology, or assisted from abroad, [sought] subversive conquest of power by means of progressive control of the Nation’ (Dulles, 1980: 448).
The hardening of Castello Branco’s position resulted not least from the limited success of his economic stabilisation programme. AI-1 had already given the president the exclusive right to propose expenditure bills to Congress which the latter could not increase. This was part of the strategy to restore public finances. Technocrats led by planning minister Roberto Campos and minister of finance Octávio Bulhões created a central bank and implemented an anti-inflationary policy (Skidmore, 1999: 177-8). Exports were promoted and the investment climate for private domestic and foreign capital improved (Hartlyn/Valenzuela, 1994: 142; Skidmore, 1985: 115-6). However, progress was slow and social costs high: the influx of international capital remained moderate while real wages fell and unemployment increased. This resulted in social and political protests which were perceived as a threat to national security. However, the hope that the 1967 National Security Law would quell any opposition was shattered. 1968 saw the climax of political protest. Workers went on strike in Osasco (São Paulo) and other cities and corporatist union leaders (who had an ‘ideology attestation’ by the military) proved unable to control their organisations. Urban middle classes and the Catholic Church began to raise their voices against a socially unjust austerity policy and institutionalised violence. A powerful student movement was organised and often displayed solidarity with striking workers. In some cases, both groups had considerable influence on local governments (Hall/Garcia, 1989: 182-4). One federal deputy, Márcio Moreira Alves, called upon Brazilians to voice their protest against militarism. For hard-line military, this was the result of Castello Branco’s yielding policy, at least after the initial purges. Now that they were in charge and the linha branda with its ESG-ideology marginalised, they wanted to carry out a ‘coup within the coup’ and install a national security state. However, even Castello’s hard-line successors Arthur da Costa e Silva (1967-1969) and Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-74) shared what Skidmore (1988: 57-8) calls the Brazilian elites’ wide-spread assumption ‘that the solution to any problem was a new law’. Therefore, even they maintained a pseudo-democratic façade: on 13 December, AI-5 closed (but did not abolish) Congress and state assemblies, suspended the 1967 Constitution, imposed censorship, and placed crimes against national security under the jurisdiction of military courts. In January 1968, the National Security Council was reorganised. Its military president became a cabinet minister (Schneider, 1971: 237-8).

Similarly, the government reshaped the SNI which would now combine the functions of a federal investigative police, secret service, military intelligence coordinator, and national security advisory board. It became an ‘invisible government’
(Rouquier/Suffern, 1995: 253). Its head, a senior army officer who presided over approximately 5,000 employees, had the rank of a minister and was often the first choice when it came to the (indirect) election of a new (Military) President of the Republic (both Médici and Euclides Figueiredo had previously headed the security service). The SNI was not subjected to any outside (financial) supervision. Its agents worked in every government agency, state enterprise, university, and branch of the armed forces. From the early 1970s, the army, navy, and air force had their own intelligence agencies though the SNI remained intact (Conniff/McCann, 1989: 266-7; Stepan, 1973: 58-9). Its founder, Golbery de Couto, admitted at the end of his life that he had created a ‘monster.’ Moreover, he disapproved of AI-5 and warned his friends in the U.S. embassy as early as January 1969 that Costa e Silva lacked leadership qualities and was surrounded by some incompetent military hard-liners. Shortly thereafter, Washington began to distance itself from Rio and reduced economic and military aid (Sotero, 1998).

The militarisation of society made a legal opposition impossible and therefore resulted in the organisation of an urban guerrilla, with Carlos Marighela’s Action for National Liberation (ALN) being the most formidable group. This armed resistance, in turn, led to a further aggravation of the 1967 National Security Law. Its modified version of March 1969 (Decree-Law 510) provided more severe penalties for terrorism, bank robberies and the interruption of public services, the usual guerrilla tactics, and strictly forbade, and punished through military courts, the ‘fostering of animosity toward the Armed Forces’ (Schneider, 1971: 279). This legislation was followed by a Constitutional Amendment No. 1 in October 1969 which, among other things, facilitated federal government intervention in the states; limited parliamentary immunity; strengthened the decree-law powers of the executive branch and the role of the military in the Superior Military Tribunal; prolonged the duration of a ‘state of siege’ decree; and introduced the death penalty, along with a confiscation of property, for those who had engaged in external warfare or any subversive or revolutionary act against the State. None of the institutional acts since AI-5 had, as those before did have, an expiry date; they were to remain in force as long as the military saw fit (Schneider, 1971: 302-3). This was until the beginning of the abertura in 1979.

By the end of October 1969, when General Médici took over power, the formation of a national security state was complete. The institutions and legislation had effaced the boundaries between State and society, public and private spheres, internal security and public safety. The militarisation of day-to-day life had reached such a scale
that the founder of the ESG, General Cordeiro de Farias, and the intellectual mastermind of the coup, Golbery do Couto, became open advocates of an abertura. Under Médici, politicians, diplomats, academics, and writers were, once again, blacklisted and lost their job. Already in April 1969, more than 200 individuals were expelled from Congress, state assemblies, the diplomatic service, Foreign Ministry, universities, and media. Among them were the Rector of the University of São Paulo and internationally known historians (Caio Prado Júnior, Emília Viotti da Costa), social scientists (Florestan Fernandes, Octávio Ianni, Fernando Henrique Cardoso), and physicists (Mário Schemberg). Equally, journalist Antônio Callado lost his political rights (Schneider, 1971: 285). If modern means of communication were used for ‘subversive propaganda’, then article 5 of the 1969 National Security Law prescribed a punishment of up to four years in prison (Flynn, 1978: 424). Censorship was especially harsh with regard to television and radio which reached an ever increasing part of the population. In contrast, print media and literature enjoyed slightly more freedom since, in a developing country with a high illiteracy rate, they rather targeted a small intellectual elite (Ginway, 1999). However, the effects of this national security legislation went further than depriving intellectuals and politicians of their political rights and censoring the media. During the Médici government alone, 4,460 political trials took place (Bernecker/Pietschmann/Zoller, 2000: 285). Until 1972, Amnesty International registered 1,076 cases of torture by 472 individual, often sadistic, torturers. A considerable number of Brazilians ‘disappeared’, a euphemism for political murder. The repressive apparatus included police, army, and paramilitary forces (Skidmore, 1988: 125-35, 150).

Nonetheless, the administration continued to portray its regime as democratic, directed against counter-revolutionary and unpatriotic elements who prevented the country from progressing towards a bright future. To get their message across, the military created a programme of civic and moral education which focused on ‘obedience to the law, commitment to work, and integration into the community’ (Grupo da Educação Moral e Cívica 1999). It was adjusted to every stage of an educational career, from kindergarten to university. Indoctrination did not stop here. General Médici installed a highly successful propaganda agency, the Assessoria de Relações Públicas (AERP), which tried to counter-mobilise the population by politicising sport, especially football, and promoting Carnival, popular music, and telenovelas (Skidmore, 1988: 110-1). The attempt to unite the nation behind a cultural nationalism ‘from above’ did not always have the desired effects. Some artists, like the Tropicalistas, used the manoeuvring space
the regime offered them to criticise it but it would not take long before they collided with the National Security Law (Dunn 1999).

The second half of the Costa e Silva government and especially the Médici administration not only represented the most repressive phase of Brazil’s military dictatorship, they also coincided with the so-called ‘Brazilian Miracle’. Between 1968 and the first oil price shock in 1973, Brazil produced unparalleled growth rates of more than ten per cent, left its South American competitor for regional hegemony, Argentina, well behind, and engaged in an ‘internal expansionism’ into the hinterland, especially the Amazon, which had geopolitical (border security, prevention of a ‘balkanization’ of Brazil through the international recognition of First Nations), economic (exploration of raw materials) and social reasons (distribution of new land in the Interior instead of an agrarian reform in the centres of colonisation) (Burns, 1993: 485-6). This expansionism and creation of a national consciousness was supported by the development of television (Mattos 1982). The regime’s propaganda machine AERP made sure that ‘many Brazilians [...] concluded that increased national power and a rapidly growing economy were the result of going authoritarian’ (Skidmore, 1988: 110). Those who did not step into this trap and criticised the political, social, and ecological costs of Brazil’s development ‘model’ were targeted by the national security apparatus. The new legislation explicitly forbade the distribution of negative news about the national economy (Skidmore, 1988: 134).

When the ‘miracle’ started, the new internationalist-liberal strategy of ‘economic development’ had already largely failed. Castello Branco himself was never an uncompromising advocate of economic liberalism. He considered nationalism ‘an engine of national history’ as long as it contributed to the attainment of national objectives, instead of class conflict, and accepted competition and partnership with foreign capital (Dulles, 1980: 453-4). The possibilities of political and economic control which corporatist decision-making and state interventionism offered, always prevented him from radically breaking with the national-statist traditions, all the more so when facing an increasing opposition (Reis Filho, 2001: 7). His successors Costa e Silva and Médici, obsessed with geopolitics and self-sustainability, were ‘right-wing authoritarian nationalists’ (Flynn, 1978: 377). They wanted to guarantee private capital accumulation, include domestic enterprises and trans-national companies into the structuring and implementation of national development plans, and mobilise foreign credits to close the gap between the need for investment and domestic savings. However, the State
consolidated its role as supreme planning and regulating authority, used its legal possibilities to intervene in the economy, and established monopolies in sectors deemed to be essential for national security (Sangmeister, 1992: 235). Moreover, when the world recession of 1974 hit Brazil and ended the ‘miracle’, Ernesto Geisel’s government even returned to an import-substituting industrialisation (Pereira, 1978: 24) while Chile’s and the second Argentinean military regime had learned the lessons and tried a neo-liberal approach.

3. From ‘Order and Progress’ to ‘National Security and Economic Development’: Justification for a New Polity in Vargas’s Dictatorial Regime

In their obsession to root out any form of unpredictable populist democracy, or Getulismo, Brazil’s military did not fully realise how much they stood in the tradition of the Estado Novo, or Varguismo. This requires a closer look at the origins of Brazil’s interwar authoritarian regime and its concern with national security and economic development.

The 1930 ‘Revolution’ resulted from the breakdown of the Old Republic’s fragile system of regional ‘pillarisation’ and political clientelism. It was not a preventative step against further mass mobilisation, as in 1964. Though the 1920s were characterised by a crisis of social and regional participation, social mobilisation remained very limited and passed its climax by 1927/ 1928. There can be little doubt that, had the Great Depression not hit Brazil and reignited the political opposition, the café-com-leite coalition would have been successful in co-opting dissident factions as so often before. The events of 1930-1937/8 followed a well-established pattern, already probed in 1817-1822/3 and 1888-1889/94: they represented a mixture of conspiracy, civil/military coup, and limited reform following an aborted revolution or at least a defused political crisis.

Though neither of the two main actors of the ‘revolution’, a new generation of gaúchos and highly politicised ‘young officers’ (tenentes), could rely on an elaborate and conclusive ideological concept, such as the ESG doctrine, an alternative political strategy did exist. Getúlio Vargas and his civil (Oswaldo Aranha et al) and military protégés (Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro, Eurico Gaspar Dutra) followed the doctrine of their political master Júlio de Castilhos, a free interpreter of Auguste Comte, whose political ideas had been deeply inculcated into Rio Grande do Sul’s political institutions. The executivismo centralizante, ‘administrative continuity,’ and political and legal engineering, so typical of
the southern state, had guaranteed that Castilhos’s heir Antônio Augusto Borges de Medeiros remained in power for a quarter of a century. When Vargas became governor in 1928, he still shared the belief in the healing powers of a Positivist developmental and educational dictatorship but tried to find a new form of political representation which responded to the demands of a more urban and industrialised society. Italo-fascist ideas of restructuring State and society along corporatist lines began to fuse with, but did not contradict, the Positivist legacy. Vargas and his followers ‘had learnt all the subtle connotations of the word “order”: order as a conservative password, order which rationalised Borges’s restrictive regime, order which left no alternative to political opponents but rebellion, order which explained the most surprising changes of line […] and order which was a prerequisite for progress, even social change’ (Bourne, 1974: 53). Order was the codeword for the formation of a centralised and corporatist nation state vested with authority (a euphemism for authoritarianism gaucho-style) and progress translated as (delayed) industrialisation through a policy of economic nationalism. Not only was the former instrumental to the latter, modernisation would also provide political stability and a place for Brazil among the world’s ‘great nations.’

Tenentes agreed with gauchos that the (formally) liberal, federalist and outward-looking state of the Old Republic, dominated by agrarian-export oligarchies and their belief in laissez-faire (though actual policies often departed from it) was to be replaced by a strong, centralist and nationalist regime which would be willing and able to intervene in both the economy and society in order to foster rapid and planned industrialisation. The Great Depression proved how important it was to overcome Brazil’s dependence on a few agricultural staple products, and a national-statist model seemed to be the only alternative to laissez-faire.

The origins of an intellectually and politically engaged army can be traced back to the ‘young officers’ of the 1880s and the changes in military careers after the Paraguayan War. Moreover, due to the absence of a nation-wide war of liberation against the Portuguese, the Brazilian army was only founded after the Independência. The coincidence of civilian and military leader during Spanish America’s revolution for independence, fertile soil for the region’s chronic caudillismo, did not exist in Brazil. Here the army was not a reliable pillar of power. In political conflicts, it often sided with the revolutionary faction. When precisely this happened in the 1831 abdication crisis, a National Guard was founded. It was to counter-balance a revolutionary army (with coronelismo becoming a Brazilian variant of caudillismo) but this policy proved to be unsuccessful. During the war
of the Triple Alliance more middle class elements gained commissions and Positivists at the Military School of Praia Vermelha challenged the notion of a neutral army. After the war, ‘young officers’ joined the abolitionist and republican movements, and between 1889 and 1894 they tried to implement their project of an enlightened despotism aiming at industrial-technical modernisation. However, eventually they had to succumb to powerful regional oligarchies which feared a politicised army, the only national institution during the Old Republic. The officer corps continued to feel neglected and complained about the civilian elites’ ignorance of national defence needs and their deviation from the 1891 constitutional system.

The army’s journal A defesa nacional, published between 1913 and 1922, reveals the ideas which motivated many ‘young officers’ to support the 1930 Revolution. Following nationalist Olavo Bilac, they hoped that their intervention would lead to a ‘political-social transformation’ of society, with them being the educators and organisers of the citizenry and the architects of a new Brazil. The country was seen as ‘an improvised nation, without roots in the past, and of indefinite ethnic formation, and therefore easy to break up.’ The enemy were not only foreign powers but also the country’s ‘lack of national cohesion.’ (McCann, 1989: 59). Among those who served on the journal’s editorial board were gaúchos like Dutra but also the young Castello Branco, who had received his military formation in Rio Grande do Sul but supported the state’s liberal opposition party (Abreu, 2001: 1209).

What was missing in the 1930 coalition, compared to 1964, was an aggressive class of industrial entrepreneurs and civil technocrats. Their formation and education ‘from above’ would be one of Vargas’s and his supporters’ main objectives.

The years from 1930 to 1937 were characterised by a crisis of hegemony which left little room for implementing a new political project. During the provisional government (1930-1934), Vargas faced harsh resistance from reunited regional oligarchies or, as one leading protagonist put it: the ‘rabble of anarchy’ against which an ‘elite of order’ was to be mobilised. In 1932, São Paulo even tried a counter-revolution. Though Vargas used its defeat to deny 14 categories of opponents their political rights for the duration of three years, among them not only the leaders of the Paulista rebellion

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1 FGO/CPDOC, OA 32.10.29 cp, folhas 974-979, O. Aranha to F. Da Cunha, Rio de Janeiro 29. 10. 1932.
and their supporters in other states but also many politicians of the Old Republic; repression and censorship remained rather moderate. Furthermore, given the fact that liberal constitutionalists retained power in the states, Vargas tried a policy of reconciliation which included the country’s re-constitutionalisation. It was the tenentes who held him in power during these difficult years and supported him in the engineering of the 1933 elections for a Constituent Assembly. However, the 1934 Constitution remained Janus-faced and preserved the hybrid status quo between Positivist gaúchos and national-revolutionary tenentes, on the one hand, and (oligarchic) liberal constitutionalists, on the other.

As early as January 1934, General Góes Monteiro published a memorandum which assessed, in a pessimistic way, what had been achieved since the 1930 Revolution. In his judgement, Brazil’s unbalanced federation, the poverty and ignorance of the rural population, and the elites’ parasitism posed a threat to national security. Therefore, he concluded, it would be necessary to strengthen national cohesion, regulate the economy, rebuild the State, and sanitise the public administration. Army, police, and the judiciary system were to unite their forces in order to protect the government from any attempt at upheaval. This included, for instance, close co-operation between preventative police and military intelligence. Their network was to cover the national territory and, in addition, to target the centres of international intrigues and conspiracies. Furthermore, Góes Monteiro wanted to strengthen the repressive (military) police, which was still controlled by the states, and organise the Conselho de Defesa Nacional under the President’s leadership (a law from 1927 had already formally created such a council). As a co-ordinating political centre, it was to subordinate the Conselho Superior de Guerra, responsible for technical aspects of warfare.

This memorandum outlined a new security architecture. It would not take long before Góes Monteiro’s ideas became reality. In February 1934, Law No. 23873 indeed organised the Conselho de Defesa Nacional which was to include, as full members with the right to vote, the President, all ministers and the chiefs-of-staff of the armed forces. Other legislative acts created a Comissão de Estudos da Defesa Nacional, a potential think tank for questions of national defence, and seções de defesa nacional in each ministry. A Secretaria-Geral da Defesa Nacional centralised and co-ordinated decision-making in this

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3 See FGV/CPDOC, OA 34.01.29/2 cp, folhas 0692-0710, Memorandum by P. A. Góes Monteiro, to Finance Secretary O. Aranha, Rio de Janeiro 29. 1. 1934.
policy field and was directly responsible to the President. The 1934 Constitution (Article 159) already referred to the installation of a Conselho Superior de Segurança Nacional, and after 1934 the term ‘national security’ replaced that of ‘national defence’ in the names of study commissions and the Secretariat-General as well.  

The creation of these institutions was complemented by new legislation. In April 1935, Vargas promulgated a first National Security Law (No. 38), the main target of which was clearly the Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL), founded in March of the same year. The Communist Party which had just recovered from a five-year long period of self-destruction played a major role in the organisation and development of this popular front. The penalties the law provided were most severe though an earlier draft had gone even further. In the revised version, any attempt to change, by force, the Constitution or form of government could be punished with six to ten years in jail for ringleaders and five to eight for accomplices. Those who tried to prevent federal authorities from exercising their powers faced two to four years in prison. If the attack was directed against individual representatives of federal, state, or local governments, prison sentences varied between six months and three years. Other political crimes to be punished by imprisonment were the instigation of collective strikes, military insubordination, class struggle, or religious conflicts; the provocation of hostilities against or between the armed forces or between them and civil institutions; and the violation of individual or property rights for political, ideological, or religious motives. Building upon a previous law from November 1934 (Carone, 1977a: 84), this first National Security Law also focused on economic crimes which were considered a question of national security: among them the paralysis of public services and supplies; the instigation of employers and employees to interrupt work for reasons other than those resulting from the production process itself; or the manipulation of prices for necessary consumer goods with the purpose of gaining personal advantage. Finally, the law imposed censorship on the media. Radio stations, newspapers, and advertising companies which engaged in what the regime called subversive or war propaganda, faced the confiscation of publications and heavy fines. If criticising the government, trade unions and professional

5 See PRO/FO 371/18648, A 3834/120/6, enclosure to W. Seeds to J. Simon, Petrópolis 7. 4. 1935.
organisations lost their legal status, civil servants and university teachers their position, members of the armed forces their commission, and naturalised foreigners their citizenship.

Similar to 1967, such a draconian security law was supposed to prevent a further radicalisation and polarisation of society but the effort was in vain. On 5 July 1935, ANL president and Communist leader Luis Carlos Prestes called upon Brazilians to overthrow the Vargas government thereby forcing the organisation into illegality. If initially the ANL had indeed enjoyed support from a broad spectrum of social and political forces, now it found itself converted into little more than a Trojan Horse of the Communist Party embracing the golpista strategy of its ex-tenente leader. The Intentona Comunista in November 1935 was not successful but provided Vargas with a justification for further strengthening national security legislation. In December 1935, a second, much tougher National Security Law followed (No. 136). It provided that, if a crime against the social and political order went hand in hand with the commitment of an ordinary crime, the penalties for both offences would be added up. The use of a weapon in an attack against an individual was an aggravating fact and led to imprisonment for ten to twelve years with hard labour. If the victim died, the offender faced 20 to 30 years in jail, again combined with hard labour. Editors and journalists who abused their ‘freedom of criticism’ could go to prison for six months to two years. A civil servant who committed a crime was not only fired but for the next ten years he would also not get a job in any public or semi-public institution. This included private enterprises working with government concessions. An employer, director or administrator who accepted a candidate from an official blacklist faced dismissal himself. Even employees in private enterprises or educational institutes could, with permission of the Ministry of Labour, end up on these backlists. Last but not least, the new security legislation allowed the government to proclaim a state of siege and to extend it without limitation. Vargas indeed governed Brazil with emergency powers until October 1937.

Though an unprecedented witch-hunt against not only Communists but all opponents of Vargas’s government had begun immediately after the suppression of the November 1935 barrack revolts, the legal system, inherited from the Old Republic and

7 See PRO/FO 371/19766, A 430/68/6,
8 ANL President Luis Carlos Prestes, for instance, was sentenced to 16 years and 8 months for his role as ringleader of the 1935 Communist barrack revolutions and to another 30 years for two political murders he allegedly ordered.
confirmed in the 1934 Constitution, still provided due-law procedures, at least formally. Except in times of war, no special tribunals could be installed. This prevented the Vargas regime from quickly trying and incarcerating those it considered to be a security risk. However, in March 1936 a state of war was proclaimed (based on a previous constitutional amendment which defined serious subversive activities against the State as a war-like situation). On this basis, a Tribunal de Segurança Nacional (TSN) was installed in September 1936 (Law No. 244). Though this National Security Court was meant to be a temporary institution, targeting primarily the COMINTERN-supported ANL leadership, it would remain intact until 1945. It had full responsibility for investigating and trying, in the first instance and even retrospectively, those military and civilians who, by order of or with support from foreign or international organisations or in relation with them, had committed crimes against the country’s external security or carried out attacks against its armed forces. This definition included subversive activities against political and social institutions which led to political turmoil and, as a consequence, war-like situations. The Supremo Tribunal Militar acted as court of second instance and appeal.⁹

The TSN was composed of military and civilians. It was part of a repressive apparatus which also included: preventative, repressive, and secret police units; a National Commission for the Repression of Communists; military-run penal colonies in the hinterland and on remote islands. Moreover, the proto-fascist Integralista movement, founded in 1932, was used to crush the extreme Left. Sadistic and pro-Nazi police chief Felinto Müller arrested hundreds of alleged Communists and introduced new methods of torture (Whitehead 1994:42). The fate of some COMINTERN-agents who had instigated the November revolts was revealing. German Artur Ewert was tortured and his wife raped in his presence; he lived on in a state of insanity. American Victor Allen Barron threw himself out of a window during police interrogations; the official version being that he committed suicide. The Jewish wife of Communist leader Luís Carlos Prestes, Olga Benário, was extradited to Nazi Germany, ignoring her pregnancy; she died in Bernburg’s gas chamber (Moraes, 1985: 107-283). However, repression did not stop with aliéntistas. Leftist deputies (Abguar Bastos, Domingos Velasco, João Mangabeira, Otávio da Silva) and senator Abel Chermont who dared to take on Arthur Ewert’s defence were incarcerated for 14 months before they were tried (Levine, 1970: 122). Vargas’s challenger in the presidential elections scheduled for 1938, Armando de Sales Oliveira, and Integralista leader Plínio Salgado were exiled (Dulles, 1967: 190-192). The

⁹ See PRO/FO 371/19767, A 7763/68/6, Mr Coote to A. Eden, Rio de Janeiro 16.9.1936.
populist governor of the Federal District, Pedro Ernesto, a tenente (Conniff, 1999: 45-47), and his minister of education, Anísio Teixeira, who had opposed the introduction of religious education as an option in school curricula both had to leave office. They were accompanied by the Rector, eight deans, the director of music and art, and other scholars of the University of Rio de Janeiro (Levine, 1970: 135). French Journalist René de Jouvenelles was arrested for carrying a membership card of the Society of the Friends of Russia (Zuvenel’ 1936). Some of Brazil’s leading artists were attacked as ‘subversive elements’: Jorge Amado, Graciliano Ramos, Gilberto Freyre, Cândido Portinari, Oscar Niemeyer, and Vargas’s biographer André Carrazoni (Levine, 1970: 135). Interestingly, when Robert M. Levine published his doctorate in 1970 and reminded readers of the victims of Vargas’s regime, General Médici’s government blocked a Brazilian edition. The similarities with practices of the military regime were striking and potentially explosive. When the book was eventually allowed to appear in Brazil during the abertura, it topped the non-fiction bestseller list for weeks.

When, on 10 November 1937, Brazilians woke up in the Estado Novo and read a new Constitution in the newspapers, a coup within the coup had taken place. Vargas remained in office and had been given dictatorial powers. No longer did he have to take into account the interests of state particularists and obstructive liberal-democratic politicians. He had successfully played off the Right against the Left, and now felt that his regime was consolidated enough to prohibit all political parties, including Integralists who had hoped for a totalitarian regime with them being in the driving seat. When it became clear that the Estado Novo would be an authoritarian-corporatist non-party regime and had no use for them, some Integralista leaders tried an unsuccessful armed attack on the presidential palace in 1938. They thereby provided Vargas and his military supporters with the justification for a further strengthening of the security edifice. If the 1937 Constitution had already preserved the security council, now called Conselho de Segurança Nacional (Wahrlich, 1983: 594; 598-599), Decree-Law No. 474 and Constitutional Amendment No. 1 of May 1938 once again aggravated the national security legislation. The decree-law introduced new regulations at the Tribunal de Segurança Nacional (now representing a special branch of the judiciary, the Justiça de Defesa do Estado) which made trials a farce. The prosecution had to accuse an alleged offender within 24 hours but could try him in his absence. The ‘defence’ was allowed to call two witnesses (though in trials with more than five defendants the number of witnesses could not exceed ten) and cross-examinations were to last no longer than five minutes. After Prosecution and
Council had given their final speech, the pronouncing of judgement had to follow within 30 minutes. Appeal proceedings had to be completed within 48 hours of the trial. The ability to promulgate such a law revealed the new realities of power. Though another law from June 1938 extended the time limitations again, the threat of a Rightist coup had been averted. The constitutional amendment introduced capital punishment for serious offences such as the violation of Brazil’s national integrity or constitutional order in cooperation with a foreign power or internationally-operating organisation; the attempt to establish a class dictatorship; an armed revolt against public authorities; the instigation of a civil war or other acts which threatened the State’s national security or the freedom and life of the President. This amendment shows clearly that the enemy was now seen to be both outside and within Brazil, on the extreme Left as well as the extreme Right.

American scholar Bailey W. Diffie who visited Brazil during the height of the Estado Novo did not share German writer Stefan Zweig’s illusions about Vargas’s regime (Zweig 1960). For Diffie (1999: 203), Brazil had become ‘a democratic country with one voter who always elects himself as saviour, and then uses arbitrary arrests, red baiting, a form of terror, censorship of the press, suppression of free speech, abolition of civil rights, nullification of academic freedom, and the systematic oppression of all forms of liberal thought and all advocates of liberal thought, as a means of perpetuating his one-man-rule’. In the name of national security, article 122 of the 1937 Constitution imposed harsh censorship over the press, cinema, theatre, and radio. The Código de Imprensa from December 1939 forbade any criticism of public authorities. In early 1938, Vargas founded a propaganda office, transformed into a Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP) on 27 December 1939 (Abreu, 2001: 1831f.). It appointed the heads of DIPinhos in the states and thereby centralised, co-ordinated, and controlled all instruments of mass communication and popular culture (Gomes, 1982: 109; Schwartzman, 1983: 61-63; Wahrlich, 1983: 41, 594-595). The Press and Propaganda Office took responsibility for censoring the news and broadcasting the official radio programme ‘A Hora do Brasil’. It skilfully created many of the long-standing myths of the Vargas Era, such as the

10 See PRO/FO 371/ 21422, A 4662/ 29/ 6, H. Gurney to Viscount Halifax, Rio de Janeiro 20. 5. 1938.
12 See PRO/FO 371/ 21422, 4662/ 29/ 6, H. Gurney to Viscount Halifax, Rio de Janeiro 20. 5. 1938.
President’s portrayal as the ‘father of the poor’, and his carefully staged appearances in public. DIP also produced the image of Brazil being a ‘racial democracy.’ In a country where the very existence of colour differences could be denied, there was no need for addressing problems of racial or ethnic discrimination. Parades on the Dias de Raça rather celebrated how far the nation had come in the process of abranqueamento and the formation of a ‘new Brazilian.’ ‘The general tendency in Brazil is toward Aryanism’ and becoming ‘a European or occidental country’, we read in an official publication (DIP 1942: 18). DIP’s National Commission for Textbooks depicted coloured people as authentic nationals but considered the discussion of differences to be detrimental and forbade any pessimism or doubt about the white future of the Brazilian race (Nava 1995: 64-65, 79). Foreign academics who challenged the myths of Vargas’s ‘democracy’ were officially criticised, even when teaching abroad.\(^\text{14}\) Within Brazil they would lose their job, no matter whether charges against them eventually had to be dropped, as in the case of American social worker Lois Marietta Williams who, for no other reason than personal vengeance, was denounced to the TSN. In her own words, ‘the full extent of my communism is that I am a reader of THE NATION and that certain of Professor Dewey’s ideas are used in our playground work.’\(^\text{15}\) This liberalism was already too much for the military who in their search for dangerous literature in school libraries even blacklisted Mark Twain’s ‘Huckleberry Finn’ (Sharp, 1940: 10-11). No wonder then that socially satirical films like Charlie Chaplin’s ‘The Great Dictator’ were immediately banned. Editors and journalists who tried to defy censorship and reveal the nature of Vargas’s regime faced penalties and repression. Critical foreign correspondents had difficulties doing their job. Telegrams going abroad were opened, private clubs penetrated by secret agents, and women used as decoys (Diffie, 1999: 200-201; Levine, 1998: 60-62; Sharp, 1940: 12).

However, in a non-party regime like the Estado Novo, Vargas’s ‘one-man-rule’ was conditional. It depended on the army which had been strengthened, united, and gradually depoliticised since 1930. The dictatorial regime placed the federal states’ Military Police

\(^\text{14}\) Karl Loewenstein’s book Brazil Under Vargas and his critical lectures on Brazil in the United States irritated Brazil’s dictator but the State Department considered Loewenstein’s analysis to be realistic. See FGV/CPDOC, DE 42.08.05, Ambassador Caffrey to State Department ('strictly confidential'), Rio de Janeiro 16. 12. 1942; and reply Foreign Office to Caffrey, Washington 21. 12. 1942. See also Loewenstein 1942.

\(^\text{15}\) NARA, RG 59, M 1472, roll 18, pp. 0905-0906, U.S. Councelor of the Embassy R. M. Scotten (in the name of the ambassador) to Secretary of State, Rio de Janeiro 11. 2. 1938. See also NARA, RG 59, M 1472, roll 18, p. 0904, Department of State/Division of the American Republics, Memorandum, s.l., 21. 2. 1938; Sharp 1940:11.
under the control of central government, completed the purges of the armed forces which had gone on since 1935, and put more emphasis on self-recruitment in the forces (McCann, 1989: 63-65). The army became the link between developmental and educational dictatorship. High-ranking officers occupied decisive positions in the State, educational, security, and propaganda apparatus and were involved in the controversial nationalisation of ‘foreign’ schools, the strengthening of civic, moral, and physical education in curricula, the formation of a youth organisation, and the colonisation of the hinterland which included the construction of ‘colônias-escolas’. Military technocrats were also represented in the councils and state enterprises which shaped economic and infrastructural development. It was in these institutions where close military-civilian cooperation first developed. In 1939, with the war approaching, the Conselho de Segurança Nacional participated in the creation of heavy industry, considered to be essential for becoming a ‘great nation’. The siting of a steel plant in Volta Redonda, called the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, was revealing, as Kapstein (1988: 138-141) stresses: decisions with regard to location (50 miles away from the coast where its supply would have been cheaper but its destruction by naval gunfire more likely), ownership (state-led for reasons of national defence, despite more lucrative private offers), and technological choice (development of expensive technology to use low-quality Brazilian coal for reasons of self-sufficiency in critical times) were all guided by national security considerations. When in 1942 pro-American forces within the Vargas administration, led by Oswaldo Aranha, gained the upper hand over pro-Axis military and the country joined the Anti-Hitler-Coalition, Brazil had another strategic advantage: it benefited from its alliance with America economically and politically. In a lecture on the occasion of the ESG’s 50th anniversary, Therezinha de Castro reminded her audience that the idea to found an elite centre for the collective study and tackling of Brazil’s developmental problems can be traced back to the creation of the Curso de Alto Comando para Oficiais e Coronéis do Exército in 1942 and the consequent visit of Brazil’s chief of General Staff to America’s National War College (Castro, 1999).

However, the closer the end of the war approached and the link to liberal America developed, the more Vargas and his dictatorship became an obstacle. It was the military which overthrew the President, not in order to abandon the strategy of national security and economic development but to continue it after the inevitable (formal) re-democratisation.
4. The Escola Superior de Guerra: Abandonment of Vargas’s Legacy?

The significance of the experiences Brazil’s Força Expedicionária (FEB) had in the Italian campaign can hardly be exaggerated. Not only did a distinct pro-Americanism develop but also command officers like Castello Branco were increasingly convinced that co-operation with foreign, especially U.S., capital would serve Brazil’s interest more than an excessively nationalist strategy (Stepan, 1973: 63-64). This did not mean a sell out of national interests but rather to define the most appropriate policy-mix to achieve realistic, but ambitious, development goals within a capitalist model of accumulation. What was needed was a collective debate, among civilian and military elites, about these objectives and the instruments to achieve them. Reliable team work, often lacking in the FEB but admired in the U.S. army, was seen as a necessary prerequisite to securing victory on the military battlefield; now it was to characterise the economic and political campaigns.

The immediate postwar period brought new conditions. Brazil had accumulated gold reserves abroad but this money was soon ‘burned’ in a massive importation of consumer goods. Further investment in heavy industries and infrastructural projects under General Dutra’s administration was largely funded through foreign credits and thereby added to the inflationary effects resulting from the pressure militant labour exerted on wages and, as a result, prices. Sangmeister (1992: 230) considers Dutra’s anti-inflationary policies after 1948 the ‘dress rehearsal for the policy of the “economic miracle.”’ This interpretation would, to a certain extent, also be valid for the twin brother of ‘economic development’, ‘national security’, though, of course, not with regard to the degree of violence employed. The Cold War ended, in Brazil as in other countries of Latin America, the experiment in liberalisation which had characterised the first two years after World War II. The alliance with the U.S. was renewed in the 1947 Rio Pact. Brazil declared the Brazilian Communist Party to be illegal, broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and repressed strikes. Brazilian officers were increasingly sent to American military academies, including in the Panama Canal Zone, and trained in civic action and counter-insurgency (Mols, 1985: 89).

The eventual foundation of the Escola Superior de Guerra in 1949 was part of this anti-democratic turn. More than ever, Brazil’s military, many of them gaúchos or trained in Rio Grande do Sul, were convinced that only they were able to plan and implement ‘national security’ and ‘economic development’, derivations from the Positivist motto of ‘order and progress’. It was now that these, so far rather diffuse, concepts were...
theoretically elaborated. Officers studied, in an interdisciplinary way, conventional and guerrilla warfare, socio-economic problems, institution-building, and social reforms (Stepan, 1973: 56). Graduation from the ESG soon became a pre-requisite for reaching the rank of general. By inviting police officers to the Escola (Kruijt, 1996: 265), the different branches of the State's security apparatus were further united. Civilian-military relations intensified. Economic leaders and politicians enrolled in the ESG or attended courses organised in regional centres. Consequently increasingly-militarised civilian elites began to consider the army a partner and, if necessary, a caretaker of their interests (Stepan, 1971: 175-177; McCann, 1988: 75).

The elaboration of the ESG doctrine coincided with Vargas's second government. The creator of the Estado Novo painfully realised that domestic and international conditions had fundamentally changed. No longer was he able to govern by decree-law or to play off the Left and the Right or the old and the new hegemonic powers. The installation of an authoritarian regime was not viable. Representative democracy had extremely fragile institutional roots and appealed little to the gaúcho President. The explosive mixture of demagogic populism and aggressive attacks on his internal and external enemies (Levine, 1998: 82-83), which resulted from this dilemma, made it impossible to guarantee stable government; it undermined the semi-corporatist structure of society with its underlying concept of regulated citizenship. Vargas and his Secretary of Labour, João Goulart, raised expectations they could not meet. The increasing social mobilisation frightened the conservative classes and the U.S. The administration's most ardent opponents in the UDN began to depict Vargas as a security risk and an obstacle to economic recovery. The ESG was concerned that the military might have to compete with labour for scarce resources (Bourne, 1974: 143). In 1954, high-ranking military issued a 'Manifesto of the Colonels' which warned Vargas of a further agitation of workers and a neglect of the army's demand for modernisation (Schneider, 1971: 66). In reality, Vargas's policies had departed little from those of the Estado Novo. The promulgation of a new National Security Law in 1953, the launching of a nuclear programme, the construction of hydroelectric power plants, the implementation of infrastructural projects, and especially the creation of a state monopoly in the strategically important oil industry (Petrobrás) are testimony to the President's continued commitment to national security and economic self-sufficiency. His economic policies pleased the dominant nationalist faction within the military but not ESG founder Cordeiro de Farias and his Cruzada Democrática which in 1952 won the
elections in the Clube Militar. For these conservatives, the participation of foreign capital in the exploration of oil resources was absolutely vital and nationalist officers were infected by Communist propaganda (Abreu, 2001: 1212, 2100).

Vargas proved unable to exorcise the many bogeys he had conjured up. However, his suicide in 1954 and the dominance of a ‘legalist’ faction within the armed forces helped populism to survive for another decade. Vargas’s first elected successor, Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-61), hid his more liberal desenvolvimentismo and experiment in ‘associated-dependent development’ behind a distinctly nationalist rhetoric. His success was spectacular and represented a liberal precursor of the 1968-73 ‘economic miracle’. However, Kubitschek pleased neither the Centre-Left which, in 1955, had founded an Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros (Jorrín/Martz, 1970: 436-441) and defended government ownership of key industries and control of foreign capital, nor the Right and its IPES think tank, created in 1962, which complained that growth had been bought at the cost of an economically and politically destabilising inflation. Jânio Quadros’s intermezzo in power and especially João Goulart’s ‘nationalist capitalism’ (Sangmeister, 1992: 232) confirmed the Right’s worst fears and prompted the military’s intervention in March 1964.

5. Synthesis

The similarities in the formation of a national security state by Vargas and the military are striking. In 1930 as in 1964, an elected government was overthrown by a civilian-military coup. In both cases, the insurgent faction intended to achieve more than a mere palace revolution. Whether gaúchos and tenentes in 1930 or Castelistas in 1964, they focused on a profound transformation of the political system, the search for a new polity in order to implement new policies. Consciously or unconsciously, they stood in the tradition of Alberto Tôrres, Oliveira Vianna, and especially Júlio de Castilhos. The option for authoritarianism was a function of their interest in generating ‘progress’ or ‘economic development’. Either of the two terms meant in reality economic growth, or ‘numerical accumulation’, not what contemporary theory understands under ‘development’, namely ‘the maximum use of a nation’s potential for the greatest benefit of the largest number of the inhabitants’ (Burns, 1993: 169-170), or, according to Nohlen’s and Nuscheler’s ‘magical pentagon’, growth, employment, equality/justice, participation, and independence (with each of these five concepts representing both means and objectives)
Due to the Great Depression, Vargas's Provisional Government had no other choice but to pursue a desarrollo hacia adentro though this was well in consonance with gaucho Positivism and the tenentes' national-revolutionary ideas. The Estado Novo confirmed the policy of economic nationalism and fostered ISI. The insurgent military in 1964 advocated economic liberalisation but most of them remained authoritarian nationalists, especially the hard-liners who took over firm control in 1967. Notwithstanding individual cases of re-privatisation and a closer co-operation with transnational companies, ISI was not abandoned and the State remained planning agency, regulator, and stern protector of industries deemed to be of strategic interest.

Both authoritarian regimes initially faced a crisis of hegemony. In 1932 (Paulistas) and 1966 (PSD), the elites of the old regime regained influence and forced the new rulers to secure their power by political engineering: Vargas convoked elections for a Constituent Assembly and introduced a corporatist element which worked in his favour while Castelistas, through AI-2 and AI-3, restructured the party system and changed the balance of powers. These changes were confirmed in the Constitutions of 1934 and 1967, respectively. However, this political engineering did not have the desired effect of eliminating any political opposition. 1935 saw the creation of a popular front (ANL), soon dominated by Communists, and 1967/8 the organisation of labour and student movements. Despite the immediate promulgation of national security laws in April 1935 and 1967, resistance continued and militant factions eventually defended the use of force against institutionalised violence: under Vargas, the Intentona Comunista, and under the military regime, urban guerrilla groups (with one of them using the acronym ALN which resembled that of the popular front). This social mobilisation challenged the two regimes but also offered hard-liners a reason for a coup within the coup which had, as its functional equivalents, the national security laws of December 1935 and 1969, the 1937 Constitution and the 1968 AI-5, and the constitutional amendments of 1938 and 1969. Arrests and torture increased and became systematised, press and propaganda offices (DIP and AERP) imposed censorship and worked on a new image for the country and its rulers, and new school curricula in civic and moral education indoctrinated children, adolescents, and university students. It was on this basis that in 1938 and 1969 Vargas's ‘authoritarian democracy’ and the military's ‘guided democracy’ were consolidated and a conservative modernisation fostered. Some of those who justified a coup in 1930 (gaucho Oswaldo Aranha) and 1964 (Castello Branco) were indeed interested in ‘improving’ democracy but in the technocratic philosophy of modernisation which guided the new
regimes there was no place for a bargaining between divergent social and political interests; the resort to authoritarian means to restructure State and society was the logical consequence. However, even after the ‘coup within the coup’ in 1937 and 1968/9, a democratic or legalist façade was preserved. This was important since ‘tyrannies do not have illegitimate enemies’ and therefore cannot define acts against the political and social order as crimes against national security (Abreu, 2001: 3058).

Similarities between both authoritarian regimes are not restricted to the institutional and legal level, but can also be personalised. Francisco Campos authored not only the 1937 Constitution but also the military’s first institutional acts and Constitution. Carlos Medeiros who took over the Ministry of Justice in 1966 had previously served as Vargas’s Solicitor-General in the 1950s. Felinto Müller became a senator and under Médici president of ARENA, the regime’s official party. All military presidents except Castello Branco and Oliveira Figueiredo were gaúchos, and so were numerous ministers and the first president of the ESG, General Cordeiro de Farias. However, due to their despising Vargas’s policy during the 1950s, they had all forgotten how much they had breathed the spirit of his dictatorial Estado Novo.

Obviously, there were also differences between both regimes. In 1964, the army took over power as an institution. With the victory of the linha dura, it became more the incarnation of the State than the guardian of the nation. This was the result of the fundamental changes in military recruitment and career patterns since the Estado Novo. In the early 1960s, every third cadet came from a military family and more than 90% of them had been educated within the army since the age of 12 (Mols, 1985: 89). A de-revolutionised army demobilised and depoliticised society. For Castello Branco, and even more so the hard-liners, the crisis of 1963/4 was more than an intra-elitist conflict or a very limited mobilisation and therefore did not allow the co-optation of dissent factions or new groups. What was at stake, in their perception, was nothing less than the capitalist model of accumulation (Flynn, 1978: 317). International Communism seemed to have penetrated not only labour but also parts of the middle and upper classes, as student revolts, guerrilla activities, and accusations by liberation theologians proved. Therefore, as Skidmore stresses, the differential treatment of lower class elements and members of the elite by legislator, police, and courts was no longer valid (Skidmore, 1988: 126; Skidmore 1999:174). Violence became more frequent and was more systematically organised though in Brazil repression never reached the same scale as in Chile after 1973 or Argentina after 1976. Even so, more than 20 years of military dictatorship and human
rights violations have cast a long shadow which can still be seen in today’s Brazil. Those who after the long transición pactada advocated a continuation of the Vargas era, forgot that the ‘father of the poor’ was also the godfather of the military’s security state. As one SNI officer expressed it: 1964 had to be seen as the ratification of the military’s historic decision in November 1935 (Giordani, 1986: 29).

The formation of a National Security State after 1930 and after 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1930 ‘Revolution’ (COUP)</th>
<th>1964 ‘Revolution’ (COUP)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Government (1930-4)</td>
<td>Castello Branco government (1964-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>double rule of gaúchos and tenentes, repression and censorship moderate</td>
<td>witch-hunt in the first three month after the coup (AI-1, expiry date: June 1966) but then repression and censorship moderate; creation of a secret service SNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elites of the Old Regime regain influence, see 1932 São Paulo’s Counterrevolution</td>
<td>Elites of the Old Regime regain influence, see 1965 Elections in States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- some citizens deprived of political rights but policy of reconciliation: engineered 1933/34 elections to Constituent Assembly</td>
<td>- 2 elected PSD governors confirmed but political engineering: AI-2/ AI-3 restructure party system and strengthen executive power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- tenentes lose influence as a political group</td>
<td>- ‘linha dura’ gains upper hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1934 Góes Monteiro’s Memorandum failure of ‘Revolution’/ new security architecture</td>
<td>March 1967 Castello Branco’s farewell words failure of ‘linha branda’/ acceptance of a security state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1934 Lei No. 23873 creation of a Conselho de Defesa Nacional; other ‘national defence’ institutions followed</td>
<td>January 1967 Constitution end of the experiment in ‘authoritarian liberalism’ or a democracia guiada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1934 Constitution Janus-faced (contains principles of liberal constitutionalism and state corporatism); mentioning of Conselho Nacional de Segurança</td>
<td>March 1935 Organisation of a popular front (ANL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/8 Labour and student movements</td>
<td>1967 Lei de Segurança Nacional (314) the military’s first detailed definition of crimes against national security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1934 Lei de Segurança Nacional (38) for the first time, a special legislation for crimes against ‘national security’</td>
<td>December 1968 AI-5 (Start of COUP WITHIN THE COUP) first AI without expiry date closed Congress and state assemblies and suspended the 1967 Constitution; SNI state within the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 1935</td>
<td>Intentona Comunista despite draconian security law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1935</td>
<td>Lei de Segurança Nacional (136) strengthening of national security legislation; proclamation of a state of war during which a Tribunal de Segurança Nacional operated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1969</td>
<td>Lei de Segurança Nacional (510) strengthening of national security legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1938</td>
<td>attempted Integralist counter-coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1938</td>
<td>Lei de Segurança Nacional (774) new TSN regulations, trials become a farce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Constitutional Amendment No. 1 further strengthening of national security legislation (introduction of death penalty)</td>
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